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TO STRIP OR NOT TO STRIP: THE DEMISE OF
NUDE DANCING AND EROTIC EXPRESSION
THROUGH CUMULATIVE REGULATIONS
A free society will always draw the line between what it considers
immoral and what it makes illegal as close as possible to the more
serious, direct, immediate, and physical of the harms, and it will
leave to the operations of social pressure, education, and self-
restraint the control of behaviors whose harm to others is less
serious, less direct, less immediate, and less physical.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of dance to express a sexual or erotic message has existed
for ages.2 In Biblical times, SalomO, daughter of Her6dias, danced for
King Herod in a provocative manner that persuaded Herod to offer her
anything she desired, even half of his kingdom. 3 In other ancient
societies, dance was used as a method of encouraging marriage and
procreation. 4  In modem society, alertness to the sexual messages
conveyed through dance has been seen by one scholar as necessary to the
survival of the human race.5
I FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, 'SPEECH ACTS' AND THE FIRSr AMENDMENT 85 (1993) (quoting John
Stuart Mill's essay On Liberty).
2 JUDrrH LYNNE HANNA, DANCE, SEX AND GENDER 22 (1988). Hanna acknowledges this
when stating:
The sexuality of dance and its potential to excite has long been recognized.
Dancing can lead to altered states of consciousness and hence to altered social
action. Dance spectators may have vicarious, empathic experiences. The Greeks
linked dance, bacchanals, and political unrest Plato feared the subversive impact
of the arts-mimesis aroused the feeling being imitated.
Id.
3 Mark 6:22-23; see also RICHARD A. PosNER, SEX AND REASON 363 (1992).4 HANNA, supra note 2, at 60 ("In the early Chou period [of China] (ca. 1100-77 B.C.), rural
communities organized spring fertility festivals, where young men and women danced
together. Liaisons formed and became regularized as marriages if the girl became
pregnant.") (citing ROBERT HANS VAN GULiX, SEXUAL LIFE IN ANCIENT CHINA 21 (1961)).
5 Id. at 13 ("Because the instrument of dance and of sexuality is one - the human body -
dancing motion attracts attention. Human survival depends upon alertness to moving
objects and reproduction."); see also id. at 46 stating:
The inherent sexuality of dance may be a reason why dance is a nearly
universal activity and why gender is coterminous with sexuality in
dance. Sexual intercourse is seen to be life generating an action with
miraculous power and a magical sense of pleasure and relief.
Courtship and foreplay arouse and anticipate. Signs of sexuality evoke
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Nude or erotic dancing at strip clubs (or adult use establishments)
has also existed for ages and despite its failure to attain the status as a
necessary tool for the survival of the human race, it has been recognized
by the United States Supreme Court as a valid form of communication
subject to First Amendment protection. 6 Nonetheless, these adult use
establishments often cause a moral uprising and conflict within the
communities that house them, leading to the drafting of restrictive
ordinances for the purpose of protecting the community from the
supposed harms.7 Originally, the restrictions were simple and limited to
bans on total nudity or a ban on the distribution of alcoholic beverages at
establishments that exhibited totally nude dancers.8 However, in time
these restrictions were expanded to include restraining the hours of
operation, requiring a minimum distance between patrons and dancers,
and eliminating all contact between dancers and patrons.9
Using the United States Supreme Court precedent from Barnes v.
Glen Theatres,'0 the lower courts upheld many of these individual
restrictions as acceptable limitations on adult use establishments. In
more recent times, communities have attempted to cripple the operations
these erotic images and sentiments. They also serve as symbolic
references to other domains of power.
Id.
6 See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 565 (1991); see also Margot Rutman, Exotic
Dancer's Employnent Law Regulations, 8 TEMP. POL & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 515, 516 (1999)
stating:
As of February 1997, Americans "spend more money at strip clubs than at
Broadway, off-Broadway, regional, and nonprofit theatres; at the opera, the
ballet, and jazz and classical music performances - combined." US. News and
World Report stated, "the number of strip clubs in the U.S. roughly doubled
between 1987 and 1992." The annual revenues from these clubs range from
$500,000 to more than five million at well run, upscale, "gentlemen's dubs."
Id.
7 See POSNER, supra note 3, at 357. Posner noted how the casual attitude toward sex was
altered with the change in religious values:
[The pervasive attitude toward sex] changed with the coming of Christianity.
Nudity became taboo; sexual desire was disparaged, and with it efforts either to
stimulate it or to satisfy it through masturbation. The sexual ideology of the
Church left no room for erotic representations, and the poverty and illiteracy of
the Middle Ages would have limited the production and dissemination of erotic
art and literature in the best of circumstances....
Id.
8 See generally Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981); see also California v. LaRue,
409 U.S. 109,118 (1972).
9 See generally infra note 16.
10 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (allowing a ban on nudity). Barnes is considered the landmark case in
this respect. Id.
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of these adult use establishments" by compiling the individual
restrictions upheld by lower courts into cumulative ordinances, thus
imposing significant restriction on these establishments. The purpose of
this Note is to analyze the constitutionality of a cumulative or
overrestrictive ordinance, and to prove that the restrictions imposed
would not stand up to the judicial scrutiny currently utilized by the
United States Supreme Court.
Lake County, Illinois, 12 recently drafted and enacted an ordinance
to help regulate the four adult use establishments in that county.13 Two
of those regulated establishments provided erotic or cabaret dancing
("strip clubs") to patrons while the other two establishments sold books,
videos, and other adult use paraphernalia ("adult bookstores"). 14 The
ordinance is similar in many ways to other local city and county
ordinances whose purpose is to alleviate the problems associated with
nude dancing establishments.' 5 The ordinance restrictions proposed by
11 An adult use establishment is commensurate to an adult entertainment establishment
defined in Lake County's 1998 ordinance as an adult cabaret, an adult store, or an adult
theatre. Lake County Ordinance, see infra note 13, at 4.
12 Lake County, Illinois borders Lake Michigan between the southern border of Wisconsin
and the northern border of Cook County, Illinois. Cook County is the county in which
Chicago lies.
13 Lake County, Ill., Ordinance 6:1-15 (Feb. 10, 1998) (unpublished ordinance, on file with
author) [hereinafter Lake County Ordinance]. The main use of the term adult use
ordinance within this note is equivalent to the ordinance's adult cabaret definition which
states:
Adult Cabaret. Any Commercial Establishment that as a substantial or
significant portion of its business features or provides any of the following:
(a) Persons who appear Semi-Nude.
(b) Live performances that are distinguished or characterized by an emphasis
on the exposure, depiction, or description of Specified Anatomical Areas or the
conduct or simulation of Specified Sexual Activities.
(c) Films, motion pictures, video or audio cassettes, slides, computer displays,
or other visual representations or recordings of any kind that are distinguished
or characterized by an emphasis on the exposure, depiction, or description of
Specified Anatomical Areas, or the conduct or simulation of Specified Sexual
Activities.
Id. at § 3.
14 The scope of this Note will be limited to analyzing the impact of the ordinance on erotic
or cabaret dancing and will not analyze the impact of placing regulations on adult
bookstores.
15 See generally Colacurcio v. City of Kent, 163 F.3d 545 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating a ten foot
barrier from the dancer to the patron was constitutional); J&B Entre't, Inc. v. City of
Jackson, 152 F.3d 362 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating public nudity restrictions were content
neutral); Sammy's of Mobile, Ltd. v. City of Mobile, 140 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating
that a ban on alcohol sales at adult use establishment was constitutional); DLS, Inc. v. City
of Chattanooga, 107 F.3d 403 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating a six foot barrier and eighteen inch
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Lake County, Illinois, and other local communities include, but are not
limited to, a ban on total nudity, a ban on serving alcohol at the
establishment where erotic dancing occurs, distance and separation
requirements between patrons and performers, elimination of all contact
with the patrons by the entertainers, restrictions on directly tipping
performers during their routine, a limit to the number of hours an
establishment can stay open, a licensing and registration requirement for
the employer and employees, and limitations on the type of signs
permitted outside the establishment. 16 Later, the Lake County Board
reconvened and passed a zoning restriction limiting the distance an
adult use business could be located from certain entities within the
county known as "protected uses."17
The purpose of the ordinance, spelled out in its recitals, 8 is to save
the community from the emergence of overwhelming secondary effects 19
stage was constitutional); Caf6 207 v. St. Johns County, 856 F. Supp. 641 (M.D. Fla. 1994),
afd, 66 F.3d 272 (11th Cir. 1995) (stating that regulations on public nudity were
constitutional); 11126 Bait. Blvd. v. Prince George's County, 886 F.2d 1415 (4th Cir. 1989)
(stating that zoning regulations on adult use ordinances were constitutional); J.L. Spoons,
Inc. v. City of Brunswick, 49 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (stating that various
requirements on adult use establishments were constitutional); Centerfold Club, Inc. v. City
of St. Petersburg, 969 F. Supp. 1288 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (stating that zoning restrictions on
adult use ordinances were constitutional); Toy Box, Inc. v. Bay County, 989 F. Supp. 1183
(N.D. Fla. 1997) (stating that ordinance banning the sale of alcohol at adult use
establishment was constitutional); Nakatomi Invs., Inc. v. Schenectady, 949 F. Supp. 988
(N.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that restrictions on nudity and restrictions on location of
establishment were constitutional); Bright Lights, Inc. v. City of Newport, 830 F. Supp. 378
(E.D. Ky. 1993) (stating that a bikini ordinance was a constitutional restriction on nudity);
City of Colo. Springs v. 2354 Inc., 896 P.2d 272 (Colo. 1995) (stating that licensing
requirements imposed by adult use ordinance were constitutional); 7250 Corp. v. Bd. of
County Comm'rs, 799 P.2d 917 (Colo. 1990) (stating restrictions on hours and age
restrictions for employees and patrons were constitutional); 2300, Inc. v. City of Arlington,
888 S.W.2d 123 (rex. App. 1994) (stating that a 'no touch' ordinance was constitutional).
16 See generally Lake County Ordinance, supra note 13, at 17-21.
17 Lake County, Ill., Amendment to Lake County Zoning Ordinance (May 12, 1998)
(unpublished amendment to ordinance, on file with author) [hereinafter Lake County
Zoning Ordinance]. The amendment defined "protected uses" as: (a) a church, synagogue,
mosque, or other place of worship; (b) a public or private nursery, elementary, or
secondary school; (c) a child care facility, licensed by the Illinois Department of Children &
Family Services; (d) a public park, playground, playing field, or forest preserve; (e) a public
or private cemetery; (f) a public housing facility. id. at 6.
18 Lake County Ordinance, supra note 13, at 1-3. Stating in two such recitals:
WHEREAS, Sexually Oriented Business Activities can cause or contribute
significantly to increases in criminal activity in the areas in which they are
located, thereby taxing crime prevention, law enforcement, and public health
services; and WHEREAS, Sexually Oriented Business Activities can cause or
contribute significantly to the deterioration of residential neighborhoods, can
impair the character and quality of such neighborhoods and the housing located
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associated with strip clubs, because these clubs have been shown in
other instances to devalue the surrounding real property values as well
as the overall quality of life in the communities near and around these
establishments. 20 This secondary effects justification for drafting
restrictive ordinances has been broadly construed by counties and
municipalities throughout the country as a way of circumventing the
constitutional infringement imposed by these laws and ordinances.
The most recent United States Supreme Court case addressing the
restrictions of adult use ordinances and the restrictions of symbolic
speech in general is Barnes v. Glen Theatres, Inc.21 In Barnes, the Court
held in a plurality decision that nude dancing was protected under the
First Amendment.22 However, the restrictions enacted in that particular
situation 23 were established principles articulated by past Supreme Court
cases dealing with the suppression of symbolic speech.24
This Note proposes that since Barnes, local municipalities such as
Lake County, Illinois, have compiled the individual restrictions upheld
as constitutional by the judicial interpretation and reasoning set forth in
Barnes and other significant cases resulting in a cumulative ordinance
that unlawfully infringes on constitutional rights and overregulates adult
use establishments. This Note further asserts that by passing cumulative
ordinances under the guise of judicial backing of individual restrictions
and the prevention of harmful secondary effects, the local ordinances
have misinterpreted the underpinnings of the United States Supreme
within such neighborhoods, and can inhibit the proper maintenance and growth
of such neighborhoods, limiting or reducing the availability of quality, affordable
housing for area residents and reducing the value of property in such areas.
Id.; see also Lake County Zoning Ordinance, supra note 17, at 1-4.
19 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51 (1986). In Renton, the Supreme
Court defines secondary effects and also states that the city of Renton could rely on the
studies done by other cities and municipalities in drafting its own ordinance to prevent the
same deterioration of property values and increase in crime from occurring in their city. Id.
at 51.
20 See generally Barnes v. Glen Theatres, 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991); J&B Entm't, Inc. v. City of
Jackson, 152 F.3d 362, 371 (5th Cir. 1998); National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham,
43 F.3d 731, 734 (1st Cir. 1995); SDJ, Inc. v. City of Houston, 636 F. Supp. 1359,1363 (S.D.
Tex. 1986).
501 U.S. 560 (1991).
2 Barnes, 501 US. at 565.
23 The restrictions imposed by the Indiana indecency law consisted of a complete ban on
public nudity, including nudity at an establishment showcasing nude, erotic dancing.
Bantes, 501 U.S. at 569.
24 Id. at 565-66; see also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968); Clark v. Cmty.
for Creative Non-Violence, 408 U.S. 288, 294 (1984).
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Court's analysis in Barnes and by-passed the blockades established to
protect individual rights and uphold the Constitution.
Part II of this Note will provide a brief history of the development
of individual rights by way of the First Amendment and the
development of nude dancing as symbolic speech. Part 1ll will provide
the current status of adult use ordinances, including a discussion of
Barnes v. Glen Theatres and a recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court case
which refused to recognize Barnes as valid precedent due to the
inconsistent methods employed by the Justices when reaching their
plurality opinion.25 Part IV will analyze how independent regulations
are upheld and why the cumulative regulations imposed by local
communities would not meet the necessary requisites to qualify as
constitutional, regardless of the methodology used. Part V will explain
why the Lake County Ordinance would fail to meet the constitutional
requirements under current United States Supreme Court precedent and
it will propose a model criminal statute that could be used as an
alternative method to regulate adult use establishments.26
II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF SYMBOLIC SPEECH
Our forefathers drafted the first guarantee of freedom of speech 27
in response to the countless years of continual English exploitation and
repression that had plagued the colonies before the Revolution.28 After
the American Revolution, the overwhelming feeling throughout the
newly-formed states was that certain individual freedoms or rights must
be preserved and hallowed by all citizens.29 When the original draft of
PAPS A.M. v. City of Erie, 719 A.2d 273 (Pa. 1998), rev'd & renanded, 120 S.Ct. 1382 (2000).
The purpose of this criminal statute would be to increase penalties for violations around
adult use establishments, thereby increasing the deterrent factor and eliminating the need
to impose cumulative regulations on these establishments; see infra notes 304 and 306 for
examples of state statutes currently employing alternative penalty measures to increase the
deterrent factor.
27 U.S. CONST. amend. I. (stating that "Congress shall make no law.. .abridging the freedom
of speech"). Id.
2 Daniel T. Rodgers, Rights Consciousness in American History, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN
MODERN AMERICA 3,4 (David J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr. eds. 1993) (surmising that
one key moment in the history of American politics was the beginning of the struggle
against the colonial policies imposed by the English resulting in "an explosion of popular
rights claims, the habit of thinking about rights with 'natural' as the key term, a passion for
rights declarations-and a nervous reaction against them-out of which, scarred and
truncated, came the Federal Bill of Rights").
29 Id. at 6. In 1776, Virginia was the first state to put together a Declaration of Rights which
included a mixture of individual rights (freedom of press and free exercise of religion)
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 3 [2001], Art. 4
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the Constitution, lacking any reference to individual rights,30 was put
before the States for ratification, the citizens of those States made the
framers fully aware of the significance and prominence that individual
rights had in their minds.3'
Subsequently, the members of Congress began the task of
incorporating a statement of individual rights by drafting an amendment
which would identify and protect certain fundamental human rights
such as freedom of religion and the freedom of speech.32 When finished,
Congress amended the Constitution to include the Bill of Rights3
although Congress was not completely convinced of the true need for all
of the amendments.34 The First Amendment, part of this Bill of Rights, is
made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution.35
A. Written or Verbal Speech
The Freedom of Speech clause in the First Amendment has been
pulled, twisted, stretched, and interpreted to encompass a boundless
array of ideas too vast to briefly summarize for purposes of this Note.36
However, out of the vast body of case law interpreting the First
along with other "pious statements of morality" to serve as the "basis and foundation" of
its Constitution. Id.30 1 d. at 7. The drafters had already carefully deleted every instance of the term "rights" in
favor of a more cautious reference to "immunities and privileges." Id.
31 Id. ("The Anti-Federalists had made enactment of a Bill of Rights a condition upon their
acquiescence.").
-1Freedom of religion and freedom of the press were two mainstays desired by the masses.
See supra note 29.
-
3 On December 15, 1791, Virginia became the required eleventh state to ratify ten of the
twelve proposed amendments, and Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson proclaimed them a
part of the Constitution. JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, A PRACTICAL COMPANION TO THE
CONSTITUTION 68 (1999). For purposes of this Note, the relevant subject matter from the
much-debated Bill of Rights is the freedom of speech.
N THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 118 (Neil H.
Cogan ed., 1997). Quoting a letter from Pierce Butler to James Iredell, August 11, 1789
stating:
A few milk and water amendments have been proposed by Mr. M[adison], such
as liberty of conscience, a free press, and one or two general things already well
secured. I suppose it was done to keep his promise with his constituents, ... but
if I am not greatly mistaken, he is not hearty in the cause of the amendments.
Id.
35 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
36 JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, A PRACTICAL COMPANION TO THE CONSTUTION 204 (1999) ("Next
to Due Process, no other constitutional provision embraces a greater variety of people,
events, and concerns.").
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Amendment, a hierarchy of speech has clearly emerged.37 Pure speech is
roughly defined as verbal expression used to convey political messages
or individual opinions and is entitled to absolute protection under the
First Amendment.38 Conversely, a speech category regarded as low
value speech such as libel and slander, obscenity and pornography, hate
speech, and fighting words is entitled to little, if any, protection from the
First Amendment.39 This speech hierarchy still exists, despite the legal
questions raised by the classification scheme and the protests from legal
scholars implying a haphazard interpretation of the true meaning of
freedom of speech.40
The first step to analyze a free speech issue is to determine where
in the hierarchy the speech falls and what level of protection is given to
the speech in question.41 A relative constant is that protection for pure
political speech42 is nearly absolute, and regulations based on the content
of the speech will not be permitted unless those restrictions meet the
strict scrutiny standard of serving a compelling government interest by
narrowly tailored means.43 Speech types of lesser or lower value have
often developed their own unique tests for determining the
constitutionality of their particular speech through precedent,44
37 Id. at 470.
38 Paul L. Murphy, Symbolic Speech and the First Amendment, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN
MODERN AMERICA 43 (David J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr. eds. 1993).
39 LIEBERMAN, supra note 36, at 470 ("From time to time, this lesser-breed category has
included subversive advocacy, libel and slander, obscenity and pornography, hate speech,
fighting words, offensive and indecent speech, commercial speech, and speech amounting
to breach of the peace.").
- ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 840 (1997) (questioning whether sexually
orientated speech that is not obscene should be regarded as low value); see also Steven G.
Gey, The Case Against Postnodern Censorship Theory, in FIRST AMENDMENT LAW HANDBOOK
221 Games L. Swanson ed., 1998-99 ed. 1999) (finding "free speech no longer commands
universal support among progressive constitutional scholars and legal activists").
41 Logically, this decision must be made so that the speaker can assess a proper course of
action based on the judicial scrutiny applied.
42 See supra note 38 and accompanying text for a definition of pure speech.
43 LIEBERMAN, supra note 36, at 470 (averring that Justice Harry A. Blackmun's decision in
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992), pointed out three central concerns of the First
Amendment: regulation of political speech, regulation of speech in a public forum, and
regulation based on the content of the speech).
" For example, obscene speech is determined by use of the test provided by Chief Justice
Burger in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) finding that:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether the
average person, applying contemporary community standards would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest,
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
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reaffirming the notion that the type of speech dictates the test used to
protect it. For example, the test to determine whether a regulation is
constitutional differs when the speech in question involves libel against a
public official rather than libel against a private individual.45 The
multitude of tests for determining what qualifies as protected speech,
although often confusing and vague, is critical to maintaining the intent
of the Constitution's Framers. 46
B. Speech and Conduct
Speech that contains an additional element of conduct has been
referred to as symbolic speech or "speech plus."47 The "plus" element
signifies when pure speech, defined in the minds of the public, has
become so entangled with an action or symbolic representation that it is
difficult to determine where speech stops and where conduct begins. By
classifying the conduct in question as a form of speech, the courts are
forced to determine the extent of First Amendment protection given to
this symbolic speech or "speech plus."48
Symbolic speech, however, is not a recently created category or
form of speech. 49 Despite a slight retreat during World War I when
recognition was denied,50 the freedom to speak through symbolic speech
has evolved to include a broad array of mediums including those outlets
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.
Id.
45 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 333 (1974).
4 LIEBERMAN, stpra note 36, at 204 ("In the eighty-odd years that the Supreme Court has
been paying attention to the Free Speech Clause, the lines of doctrine have become so
multitudinous that no single formula can come close to explaining free speech, and no
single summary can possibly fit all the cases.").
47 Paul I Murphy, Symbolic Speech and the First Amendment, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN
MODERN AMERICA 43 (David J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr., eds., 1993) (noting the
political culture in the 1950's, '60's, and '70's resulted in the increased protesting of the
government and government policy through marches, picketin& and sit-ins evolved into a
new derivative of 'pure speech' (i.e. verbal expression) called 'speech plus').
48 Id. at 43-44.
49 See id. "Symbolic expression is as old as mankind. It has played a vital role in political,
and certainly in religious, life for centuries. The colonial cause in the American Revolution
was expressed symbolically at many turns, the Boston Tea Party being a prime example."
Id.
so Id. "Government used symbolism to rally patriotism to the defense of the nation and the
status quo in the face of external and internal assault and criticism. And it used the
Espionage and Sedition Acts, passed by Congress in 1917 and 1918, to prosecute
individuals who criticized the war overtly or symbolically, whether in speech or print." Id.
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which, upon first glance, would never have been considered speech in
the past.5'
The real issue with symbolic speech is how to distinguish it as
speech and how to regulate it, if at all. To determine what speech
qualifies for regulation, the Supreme Court determined that two
elements were essential.52 In order to qualify as speech, the conduct
must first be intended to be communicative, and secondly, the message
conveyed must be reasonably understood by the viewer.53 Once it is
established that the conduct is communicative under the previous two-
part definition, it may be forbidden or regulated only if a difficult four-
pronged test s4 proposed in United States v. O'Brienss is met.5
In O'Brien, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of O'Brien,
who burned his draft card on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse.57
This decision was important because the Court stated that it would allow
the government to make incidental restrictions on "speech plus," or
symbolic speechsa In this case and the cases that followed it, the
restrictions on free speech were allowed due to the distinction between a
content-based restriction and a content-neutral or a time, place, and
manner restriction.59
Content-based restrictions or regulations of speech are given less
deference by the Court because the content or message of the speech
itself is what is vital to maintaining the individual freedoms granted by
s' See Stephen L Carter, Does the First Amendment Protect More Than Free Speech?, 33 WM. &
MARY L REV. 871 (1992). In 1977, the underlying sentiment at Yale was that everything
was protected by the First Amendment Id. at 871. The author describes how clothes
hanging on a line to dry would qualify for First Amendment protection. Id.52 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
53 Id. at 404, 406 (holding that flag burning qualified as expressive conduct subject to First
Amendment protection); see also Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
294(1984).
u' See infra note 65 and accompanying text for the test proposed by United States v. O'Brien.
- 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
s6 Clark, 468 U.S. at 294.
57 0'Brien, 391 U.S. at 372- In its reasoning, the Court found that the power of Congress to
raise and support armies was broad and sweeping. Id. at 377. Also, the Court found that
the draft certificates served an important function in allowing the government to track
those who registered and punish those who did not. Id. at 380.
" Id. at 376 (finding that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the
same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on the First Amendment freedoms").
59 Id. at 376-77.
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the framers.6 0 Thus, to regulate content based conduct the Court adopts
the strictest standard of review by requiring a compelling government
interest coupled with means that are narrowly tailored to meet that
government interest.61
Content-neutral restrictions or regulations do not regulate the
content of the speech per se, but they regulate the manner or method
used to convey the speech.62 Two decisions that provide an example of
tests used to determine the constitutionality of a content-neutral
regulation are O'Brien and Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence.63
In the first example, the O'Brien Court ruled that a regulation of content-
neutral speech would be sustained if the regulation was within the
constitutional power of the Government, if it furthered an important or
substantial government interest, if the interest was unrelated to the
suppression of free expression, and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms was no greater than was essential to the
furtherance of that interest.64
In the second example, Clark, the Court held that symbolic speech
was subject to valid time, place, and manner restrictions as long as the
restrictions were justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, the restrictions were narrowly tailored to save a
significant government interest, and they left open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information.5 Both content-neutral
tests convey the same basic requirements for restricting symbolic speech
10 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986) ("This Court has long
held that regulations enacted for the purpose of restraining speech on the basis of its
content presumptively violate the First Amendment").
61 Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 593 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
62 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,293 (1984) ("Expression, whether
oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to reasonable time, place, or manner
restrictions.").
6' 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
"O'Briti, 391 U.S. at 377. O'Brien burned his draft card in public in violation of the
Selective Service Act of 1948. Id. at 369-70.
65 Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. In this case, demonstrators had applied for permits to camp in
Lafayette National Park in downtown Washington, D.C., to demonstrate the plight of the
homeless. Id. at 291-92. In accordance with the license, the campers were not allowed to
stay in the park overnight. Id. at 292. The campers argued that sleeping outside in the park
was an integral part of their protest because it would demonstrate the struggle to survive
without a place to stay, thereby bringing the issue to the attention of lawmakers. Id. at 296.
The Supreme Court held that the camping permit restrictions were not aimed at the content
of the speech but more so the manner in which the demonstration can be carried out and
therefore they were not unconstitutional. Id. at 295.
Hansen: To Strip or Not to Strip:  The Demise of Nude Dancing and Erotic
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2001
572 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35
and have been used interchangeably by the United States Supreme
Court.66
Based on these past decisions, "symbolic speech" emerged,
requiring the combination of a message and conduct. As the variety and
forms of symbolic speech grew, the question arose as to whether nudity
or erotic dance qualified for similar status.
C. Nudity and Erotic Dance as Speech
Nudity in public places has long been viewed as contrary to public
decency.67  However, when nudity is combined with dancing, a
communicative element is added to the nudity which may influence the
type of analysis utilized by the courts when ruling on the protection
afforded such dance.68 Despite the mystery surrounding the origins of
erotic dance, the display of naked flesh during dance appears to have
originated in the cancan and music hall chorus lines of the nineteenth
century. 69 As societal views changed, the standard for what triggered
the sexual message associated with nude dance also changed,
culminating in a decrease in the amount of clothing to the point of
nudity.70 The United States Supreme Court recognized that sexually
16 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566.
67 Id. at 568. The Supreme Court states that "Public indecency, including nudity, was a
criminal offense at common law, and this Court recognized the common-law roots of the
offense as 'gross and open indecency' in Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948).
Public indecency statutes.., reflect moral disapproval of people appearing in the nude
among strangers in public places." Id.
6 See POSNER, supra note 3, at 364 stating:
But to return to the striptease, what is its specific erotic representation?
Striptease, is not, after all, just the exhibition of a naked women. It is a form of
undressing. It is undressing for sex - that, at least, is the impression that the
performer seeks to convey by her gestures and facial expression. It is nudity plus
an additional signal of erotic intention or disposition, much as Venus with a
Mirror is nudity plus an additional signal supplied by the presence of Cupid. In
both cases there is an implicit narrative which the viewer is left to complete in his
imagination. That is why it is important that the striptease not end in a bathing
suit, because a bathing suit is for swimming, not for sex. If the striptease
performer is an accomplished dancer and the musical accompaniment is of high
quality as well, the striptease may, like a work of art, embody formal properties
that have an appeal to the nonerotic sensibility may be a work of art. But the
erotic signal that I have described imparts to striptease an unmistakably, and
ordinarily a dominant, aphrodisiacal effect.
Id.
69 Id. at 363.
70 See id. at 363-64 stating:
For nudity to be an erotic signal, it must be associated with sex, so the norm of
privacy in sexual relations entails the rejection of public nudity, and public
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orientated speech such as nude dancing, although low on the proverbial
First Amendment ladder, was protected by the First Amendment when it
struck down a city ordinance used by a locality in Schad v. Mount
Ephraim?' to prohibit all live entertainment and to facilitate the closing of
strip clubs.72 Other regulations on nude dancing were upheld in
California v. LaRue,73 in which California banned the sale of alcohol at all
strip clubs.74 As the number of restrictive ordinances increased, the
United States Supreme Court was forced to answer the mounting
question of just how much protection nude dancing was allowed under
the First Amendment.
Ill. CURRENT STATUS OF ADULT USE ORDINANCES
Prior to the landmark decision in Barnes v. Glen Theatres, Inc.,75
handed down by the Supreme Court in 1991, the Court definitively
recognized that erotic dancing qualified as symbolic speech under the
First Amendment.76 In LaRue, actions were brought by owners of
taverns against the California Department of Alcoholic Beverages
Control for imposing regulations limiting the type of entertainment that
could be performed in an establishment that serves liquor." The
nudity in turn implies a transgression of sexual norms. There are of course
degrees of nudity. The stronger the nudity taboo, in the sense of the more fully
clad the body is expected to be, the smaller is the amount of nudity required to
imply a sexual context and therefore to convey an erotic signal. When the nudity
taboo was very strong in our society, the decorous striptease - even the bare
thighs of the Radio City Music Hall Rockettes - conveyed a distinctly erotic
image. Now that the taboo has greatly weakened, and many respectable women
go about their everyday business in what would have been considered a state of
nudity or the garb of prostitutes a couple of generations ago, a striptease that
ended with the stripper clad in a bathing suit would not convey a strong erotic
signal. For that, more is needed: complete nudity, or at least the exposure of the
sexual organs.
Id.
-452 US. 61 (1981).
72 See Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66-67 (1981) (stating nude dancing falls
within the First Amendment but also leaving the extent of protection unclear as a result of
the local ordinance being found as substantially overbroad); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 40, at 838.
73 409 U.S. 109 (1972) ("The broad sweep of the Twenty-first Amendment has been
recognized as conferring something more than the normal state authority over public
health, welfare, and morals.") Id. at 114.
74 LaRue, 409 U.S. at 118-19.
- 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
76 Banzes, 501 U.S. at 565.
" LaRue, 409 U.S. at 110-112. California was concerned with the rapid progression in the
entertainment at these establishments from topless to bottomless dancing. Id. Evidence
was also produced in this case which showed an increase in the amount of prostitution in
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performances occurring in these establishments were topless and
bottomless dancing.78  The Court held that the liquor restrictions
imposed by the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control
were constitutional. 9 A critical notion that arose from this case, in terms
of the current status of case law, is that the United States Supreme Court
also recognized that the type of dancing, topless or nude, which occurred
in these California bars was subject to protection under the First
Amendment.8 0
Three years later, the Court revisited the issue of topless dancing
in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.81 when bar owners contested a local ordinance
banning topless dancing.82 The Court again affirmed its position that
barroom dancing has some First Amendment privileges8 3 however, in
contrast with LaRue, the Court struck down this local ordinance because
it was too broad and encompassed restrictions that would take away
certain speech qualities from other protected modes of media like artistic
exhibitions.8 4
and around the establishments with nude dancing, as well as an increase in other serious
crimes like sexual assaults, rapes, and indecent exposures. ld.
78 Id. at 110.
79 LaRue, 409 U.S. at 118. The Court stated:
The substance of the regulations struck down prohibits licensed bars or nightclubs
from displaying, either in the form of movies or live entertainment, 'performances'
that partake more of gross sexuality than of communication. While we agree that at
least some of the performances to which these regulations address themselves are
within the freedom of expression, the critical fact is that California has not forbidden
these performances across the board. It has merely proscribed such performances in
establishments that it licenses to sell liquor by the drink.
Id.
8 0 d. The Court compares the message conveyed in nude dancing to the message conveyed
in a ballet performance and indicates that the former is given less weight in terms of First
Amendment Protection. Id.; see also supra notes 37-40, which establish that a hierarchy
exists for purposes of a First Amendment analysis.
8' 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
82 Id. at 924.
83Doran, 422 U.S. at 932. The Court recognized that the standard proposed in California v.
LaRue was applicable to this situation when it stated that this form of entertainment was
worthy of First and Fourteenth Amendment protection. Id. The Court, however, found
this ordinance to be unconstitutional by distinguishing it from the ordinance in LaRue. Id.
at 932-33. In LaRue, California's Twenty-first Amendment powers outweighed any State
interest in the protection of nude dancing under the First Amendment Id. The ordinance
in Doran covers not only places that sell liquor, but "any public place," as well. Id. at 933.
84 Id. The Court re-affirms this message by pointing out the broad definition of any public
place and how this interpretation could lead to banning of truly artistic plays and
exhibitions. Id.
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The different conclusions reached in the LaRue and Doran cases
highlight a distinction between establishments that serve liquor and
those that do not.8 5 LaRue relied on the state's power under the Twenty-
First Amendment while Doran viewed the ordinance as overbroad. 86
However, the common thread that links these cases is the principle that
nude dancing is protected by the First Amendment.8
In 1989, the City of South Bend, Indiana, sought to enforce the
State of Indiana's Public Indecency Statute88 against local establishments
that provided adult entertainment and nude dancing because these
establishments included dancing and exhibitions of semi-nude and
totally nude women in violation of the statute. 89 After an unsuccessful
attempt to obtain an injunction against enforcement of the statute by the
State of Indiana, the case was refiled citing a new cause of action: a
violation of First Amendment privileges.90 The district court, on remand,
ruled that the nude dancing sought to be protected was not an
expressive activity and not worthy of First Amendment protection.91 On
95 Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081,1083 (7th Cir. 1990).
NId.
9 7 Id.
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-4-1 (West 1998) (amended 2000).
(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place: (1) engages in
sexual intercourse; (2) engages in deviate sexual conduct; (3) appears in a state of
nudity; (4) fondles the person's genitals or the genitals of another person;
commits public indecency, a Class A misdemeanor.
(b) "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic
area, or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of the
female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple, or
the showing of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state.
(c) A person who, in a place other than a public place, with the intent to be seen
by persons other than invitees and occupants of that place: (1) engages in sexual
intercourse; (2) engages in deviate sexual conduct; or (3) fondles the person's
genitals or the genitals of another person; where the person can be seen by
persons other than invitees or occupants of that place commits indecent
exposure, a Class C misdemeanor.
Id.
89 Miller, 904 F.2d at 1082; see also Barnes, 501 US. at 563. One plaintiff to the action, the
Kitty Kat Lounge, offered totally nude dancing to its patrons while the other plaintiff, Glen
Theatre, mostly provided written and printed adult material but also had live
entertainment consisting of totally and semi-nude women through glass panels. Barnes,
501 U.S. at 563.
90 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 563-64. The district court initially granted the injunction on
overbreadth grounds but was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on
the grounds that the Indiana Supreme Court had limited the construction of the statute to
save it from an overbreadth attack. Id. The case was remanded to the District Court for the
plaintiffs to refile under a First Amendment claim. Id.
9Glen Theatre, Inc. v. City of South Bend, 695 F. Supp. 414,419 (N.D. Ind. 1988).
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appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court's decision by
holding that the dancing was constitutionally protected by the First
Amendment. 92
The appellate court then heard the case en banc and concluded in a
majority opinion that nonobscene 93 nude dancing is symbolic conduct
protected by the First Amendment, and that the Indiana public
indecency statute was unconstitutional because its purpose was to
suppress the erotic message conveyed by the dancers. 94 Due to the
confusion and contradiction seen in this particular line of decisions as
well as in past United States Supreme Court decisions,95 the Court
granted certiorari to definitively decide what level of constitutional
protection erotic or nude dancing should receive.9 Unfortunately, no
majority opinion resulted,97 and the plurality decision which followed
led to further indecisiveness as is exemplified by the recent Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decision in which the plurality decision of the United
States Supreme Court was abandoned.98
92 Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1086-87 (7th Cir. 1990). The court noted:
The dominant theme communicated here by the dancers is an emotional one; it is
one of eroticism and sensuality. Though this dance is clearly of inferior artistic
and aesthetic quality as contrasted with a classic ballet such as the Dance of the
Seven Veils in Strauss' Salome, the erotic message communicated to the viewers
is present in both performances.
Id.
93 See supra note 43 for Miller v. California's definition of obscene conduct.
94Miller, 904 F.2d at 1086-87. In holding the dancing was protected, the court relied upon
many factors including the historical background of dancing as expressive speech, prior
Supreme Court precedent, and prior judicial interpretation at the federal court level. Id.
9 See supra note 79-90 and accompanying text.
96Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 498 U.S. 807 (1990).
97CHEMERINSKY, supra note 40, at 839.
9 In PAP'S A.M. v. Erie, 719 A.2d 273 (Penn. 1998), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court first
sarcastically adopts the underlying view of the United States Supreme Court, which
supports nude dancing as protected speech when it states "although Barnies was an
otherwise hopelessly fragmented decision, eight of the nine members of the Court agreed that
nude dancing, as it portrayed an erotic message, is expressive conduct and is entitled to
some quantum of protection under the First Amendment." Id. at 276 (emphasis added).
Next, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court summarily dismisses the use of the plurality
decision as precedent.
While we empathize with the [lower court's] plight when faced with trying to
make sense out of Barnes, we cannot agree that Justice Souter's concurring
opinion is binding precedent. We agree that it is possible to cobble together a
holding out of a fragmented decision. Yet, in order to do so, a majority of the
Court must be in agreement on the concept which is to be deemed the holding. It
is certainly permissible to find that a Justice's opinion which stands for the
"narrowest grounds" is precedential, but only where those "narrowest grounds"
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Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the plurality decision in which the
Supreme Court acknowledged that the type of nude dancing at issue in
Barnes was previously recognized by the Court as having constitutional
value under some circumstances."9 He also deemed the pubic indecency
restriction as content-neutral thus triggering the analysis in United States
v. O'Brien.10 Barnes provides guidelines for determining when symbolic
speech can be regulated by a government entity10'
The plurality decision argues that the first and second prongs 02 of
the O'Brien test are met because of the clear constitutional power of
Indiana to pass an indecency law and the substantial government
interest Indiana is attempting to achieve, namely the regulation of
morality. 103 The third prong of the O'Brien test states that the interest
must be unrelated to the suppression of free expression.0 4 Although
conceding that restricting nude dancing could be related to the
expression of the speech, 05 the plurality dismissed this notion by stating
that the restriction on nudity was not imposed to minimize the erotic
message, but rather to address the evil of nudity by making the erotic
are a sub-set of ideas expressed by a majority of other members of the Court.
The mere finding that one Justice expressed a narrower belief than others does
not dispense with the requirement that a majority of the Court need agree on a
concept before that concept can be treated as binding precedent
Id. at 278 (footnote omitted).
w Barnes, 501 U.S. 560, 565 (1991) (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion).
100 Id. at 566-67. Chief Justice Relnquist states that because of the similarity in the two
analyses, the Court will turn to the rule enunciated in O'Brien. Id.
1m Id. at 567. "The Court has held that when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are
combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in
regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms." Id.
102 See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the four part O'Brien
analysis.
103 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 567-68 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion); see also Jeffrey P. Dunlaevy,
Note, Dirty Dancing: The South Carolina Supreme Court Rejects Local Authwrity to Ban Nude
Dancing by Fast-Stepping Around the Plain Meaning of the South Carolina Constitution, 49 S.C.
L. REv. 1025, 1029 (1998).
Although it is plausible that morality supports the proscription of public nudity,
it is unclear why such an interest is categorically substantial. The determination
of substantiality seems best made by the community, which ultimately expresses
its degree of moral disapproval of public nudity by enacting or not enacting laws
prohibiting the conduct. In the final analysis, a court cannot determine the
strength or legitimacy of a community's morality any better than the community
itself.
Id.
I("O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,377 (1968).
l0 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion).
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message less graphic.106 Finally, the plurality found that the G-string
and pasties requirement is no greater than necessary to further the
governmental interest because the Indiana clothing requirement "is
modest, and the bare minimum necessary to achieve the State's
purpose." 107
The most conservative decision from the Barnes opinion was that
proposed by Justice Scalia where he declined to award erotic dancing
any First Amendment protection.108 Justice Scalia reasoned that the
regulation of conduct not specifically directed at expression did not
demand First Amendment scrutiny.109 Because the purpose of the
Indiana statute was to enforce a traditional moral belief that exposing
private parts is wrong, Justice Scalia found there was no need to address
the communicative aspect of this claim.110
Justice Souter concurred in the Barnes opinion by agreeing with the
plurality on all aspects except one."' The reason for writing separately
lies in Justice Souter's preference for the use of preventing harmful
secondary effects as a substantial government interest, in accordance
with the second prong of the O'Brien test, over the use of morality as
justification for regulation.12 By using adverse secondary effects to
1 Id. at 571. Chief Justice Rehnquist writes:
Likewise, the requirement that the dancers don pasties and G-strings does not
deprive the dance of whatever erotic message it conveys; it simply makes the
message slightly less graphic. The perceived evil that Indiana seeks to address is
not erotic dancing, but public nudity. The appearance of people of all shapes,
sizes, and ages in the nude at a beach, for example, would convey little if any
erotic message, yet the State still seeks to prevent iL Public nudity is the evil the
State seeks to prevent, whether or not it is combined with expressive activity.
id.
1071d. at 572.
108 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
109 Id.
110 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 575 (Scalia, J., concurring).
mhe only First Amendment analysis applicable to laws that do not directly or
indirectly impede speech is the threshold inquiry of whether the purpose of the
law is to suppress communication. If not, that is the end of the matter so far as
First Amendment guarantees are concerned; if so, the court then proceeds to
determine whether there is substantial justification for the proscription.
Id. at 578.
"I Barnes, 501 U.S. 581-82 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter states "thus I agree with
the plurality and the dissent that an interest in freely engaging in the nude dancing at issue
here is subject to a degree of First Amendment protection. I also agree with the plurality
that the appropriate analysis to determine the actual protection required by the First
Amendment is the four-part inquiry described in United States v. O'Brien." Id.
112 Id. at 582.
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support the Indiana indecency law, the Court is not limiting itself to
determining the moral justifications or reasons for a law from the
legislative record. 13 Justice Souter relied on the holding from Renton v.
Playtime Theatres,114 which allowed the city of Renton to rely on the
results and data obtained from studies done by other nearby cities as
sufficient proof of the substantial government interest in protecting
society.115  By assimilating the Renton scenario with the situation
resulting from Indiana's indecency law, Justice Souter found that this
prong of the O'Brien test was met.116
Justice Souter argued that the third prong of O'Brien, which
requires that the government interest be unrelated to the suppression of
free expression, was met regardless of the erotic expression's association
with the associated evils as the support for imposing the restriction.1 7
The mere existence of the dancing establishment is the catalyst for the
adverse secondary effects and not the expressive message being
conveyed and, therefore, restricting these establishments satisfies the
third prong of the O'Brien test.118 The fourth prong of the O'Brien test is
casually dismissed as satisfied by Souter when he states, "[d]ropping the
final stitch is prohibited, but the limitation is minor when measured
against the dancer's remaining capacity and opportunity to express the
erotic message." 119
113 Id. Justice Souter recognizes the difficulty caused by the lack of legislative history and
thus he supported a more forgiving approach when he states "[W]e need not so limit
ourselves in identifying the justification for the legislation at issue here, and may
legitimately consider [Banzes]' assertion that the statute is applied to nude dancing because
such dancing encourages prostitution, increases sexual assaults, and attracts other criminal
activity." Id.
114 475 U.S. 41, 51 (1986).
115 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 584 (Souter, J., concurring). Souter states:
In light of Renton's recognition that legislation seeking to combat the secondary
effects of adult entertainment need not await localized proof of those effects, the
State of Indiana could reasonably conclude that forbidding nude entertainment
of the type offered at the Kitty Kat Lounge and the Glen Theatre's 'bookstore'
furthers its interest in preventing prostitution, sexual assault, and associated
crimes.
Id.
116 Id. at 585-86.
117 Id. at 586.
118 Id. Justice Souter states "Mhe 'secondary effects' justification means that enforcement of
the Indiana statute against nude dancing is 'justified without reference to the content of the
regulated expression', which is sufficient, at least in the context of sexually explicit
expression, to satisfy the third prong of the O'Brien test." Id.1 9 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 587 (Souter, J., concurring).
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Aside from Justice Scalia, the plurality and the concurring Justice
agreed that the symbolic speech represented in this scenario qualified for
First Amendment protection. 20 They also employed a similar test in
analyzing the content-neutral restriction on speech when reaching their
conclusions.' 21 However, because of a lack of a majority opinion and
because Justice Souter's concurring opinion is decided on the narrowest
grounds,122 the use of Justice Souter's reasoning is seen as the controlling
precedent for issues addressing erotic and nude dancing as symbolic
speech. 2 3
The dissenting opinion 24 in this landmark case first attacks the
plurality and concurring Justices' use of the O'Brien test, starting with
the substantial government interest prong. 23 The dissent finds flawed
reasoning in the plurality's use of protecting the public from a moral
indecency, especially when the viewers of this erotic dance have most
likely entered a private establishment on their own free will and have
paid to view the erotic dancing and the message conveyed therein.12
Next, the dissent attacks the plurality's denial of "proscribing nudity
because of the erotic message conveyed by the dancers." 127 The
plurality's reasoning is that the true goal of the law is to forbid the
nudity, which is morally wrong, and not the erotic message being
conveyed by the dance. 28 However, because the law allows the erotic
dance to continue with a G-string and pasties, it is precisely this nude
120 Justice Rehnquist states "[Nude dancing of the kind sought to be performed here is
expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though we view it
as only marginally so." Id. at 566 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion). Justice Souter states
"But dancing as a performance directed to an actual or hypothetical audience gives
expression at least to generalized emotion or feeling, and where the dancer is nude or
nearly so the feeling expressed, in absence of some contrary clue, is eroticism, carrying an
endorsement of erotic experience." Id. at 581 (Souter, J., concurring).
1i See supra notes 103 and 114 and accompanying text.
122 Precedent dictates that Souter's concurring opinion controls. See Mark v. United States,
430 U.S. 188,193 (1977) ("When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those members who concurred in the judgment on the
narrowest grounds.").
123 J&B Entm't v. City of Jackson, 152 F.3d 362 370 (5th Cir. 1998); DIS, Inc. v. Chattanooga,
107 F.3d 403,408 (6th Cir. 1997).
124 Justice White, Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stevens dissented from this
opinion. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 587.
25 Id. at 589-91 (White, J., dissenting).
12 Id. at 591. Forbidding nudity in public could not be the true reason for regulation "since
the viewers are exclusively consenting adults who pay money to see these dancers." Id.
12 Id.
In Id. at 591-92
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component which adds a certain expressive element, unlawfully
forbidden by the statute.129
The dissent favors a strict scrutiny analysis because it views the
nude dancing as a type of artistic dance"30 worthy of the most exacting
scrutiny.'3' Because the Indiana indecency statute is not narrowly
tailored, it cannot be upheld as constitutional.132 The dissent even
proposes alternative methods for protecting against the associated
secondary effects such as distance requirements, hour restrictions, and
zoning restrictions,133 some of which can be seen in the Lake County,
Illinois, ordinance. 34
Despite the United States Supreme Court ruling in Barnes and the
continued reliance placed on Justice Souter's concurring opinion as
precedent for erotic dance issues, the definitive legal analysis remains
unclear.135 As previously discussed, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
reviewed PAP'S A.M. v. Erie"6 to reopen the issue,137 and in doing so it
did not adopt the precedent handed down by Barnes because of the lack
129 Id. at 592.
130 The Court states:
[While the entertainment afforded by a nude ballet at Lincoln Center
to those who can pay the price may differ vastly in content (as viewed
by judges) or in quality (as viewed by critics), it may not differ in
substance from the dance viewed by the person who... wants some
'entertainment' with his beer or shot of rye.
Barnes, 501 U.S. 594 (White, J., dissenting) (citing to Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 501 F.2d 18,21
(2nd Cir. 1974)).
131 Barnes, 501 U.S. 593 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent likens the symbolic conduct to
the scenario depicted in Texas v. Johnson, 491 US. 397, 411-12 (1989), wherein the Court
state, "[w]hether Johnson's treatment of the flag violated Texas law thus depended on the
likely communicative impact of his expressive conduct .... We must therefore subject the
State's asserted interest in preserving the special symbolic character of the flag to 'the most
exacting scrutiny."' Id.
132 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 594 (White, J., dissenting).
13 Id.
14 See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
13 Evidence of the unclear precedent can be seen by the United States Supreme Court's
need to revisit the erotic dance issue by granting certiorari to PAP'S A.M. v. Erie, 119 S.Ct.
1753 (1999); see also Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of Akron, 40 F.3d 129, 134 (6th Cir. 1994)
(noting that following the United States Supreme Court's precedent on this issue was
hopelessly limited to "reading the tea leaves of Barnes").
1- 719 A.2d 273 (1998).
137 Danielle N. Rodier, Strippers, Justices to Meet Again: High Court Will Hear a Second Nude
Dancing Case, 22 Pa. L. Wkly. 1034 (1999) ("Bare breasts will once again be a source of
contention in the state Supreme Court, now that the justices have agreed to hear an
argument against the constitutionality of a Liquor Control Board law that requires
strippers to cover up certain areas of their bodies.").
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of clarity disseminated by the "hopelessly fragmented Barnes Court."138
It did, however, follow the same methodology when it attacked the
erotic dance issue.139 The court's first obstacle was to determine if the
regulation was content-based or content-neutral. 14° If the ordinance was
content-based, or related to the suppression of expression, then strict
scrutiny would apply.141 If the ordinance was content-neutral, then the
less stringent standard for regulating noncommunicative conduct
proposed by O'Brien'42 would control the analysis. 43
In spite of its acknowledgment of the secondary effects addressed
by the Erie County ordinance,'" the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could
not overcome the suppression of the expressive element within the erotic
dance, and thus it used a content-based analysis and the strict scrutiny
standard that accompanies it.145 When applying this standard through
13 See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text (discussing the use of Souter's opinion as
precedent); see also PAP'S A,M., 719 A.2d at 278 for a discussion of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's abandonment of Souter's concurring opinion.
It is simply not possible to find that Justice Souter's position in Barnes
commanded five votes. Even if we were to assume arguendo that his concurring
opinion provided an approach which was "narrower" than, and yet still
encompassed by and consistent with, the one taken by the Chief Justice, such a
concession would provide only four votes for Justice Souter's position. The fifth
vote for Justice Souter's position is not forthcoming. It cannot be provided by
Justice Scalia, who believed that restrictions on nude dancing are not to be
analyzed pursuant to the First Amendment. Nor can it be said that the
dissenters, who rejected the notion that the state's goal of combating secondary
effects via the statute rendered the statute content-neutral, were in agreement
with Justice Souter.
We find that the Commonwealth Court's determination that Justice Souter's
"secondary effects" rationale represents the "holding" of Barnes is simply not
borne out. In fact, aside from the agreement by a majority of the Barnes Court
that nude dancing is entitled to some First Amendment protection, we can find
no point on which a majority of the Barnes Court agreed. Thus, although we may
find that the opinions expressed by the Justices prove instructive, no clear
precedent arises out of Barnes on the issue of whether the Ordinance in the
matter sub judice passes muster under the First Amendment.
Id.
13 PAP'S A.M., 719 A.2d at 277.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 391 U.S. 367 (1968); see also supra note 65 and accompanying texL
I- PAPS A.M., 719 A.2d at 277.
144 Id. at 279.
15 Id. In its choice of a content-based analysis, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court states:
It is only because nude dancing performances may generate emotions and
feelings of eroticism and sensuality among the spectators that the State seeks to
regulate such expressive activity, apparently on the assumption that creating
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its own analysis, 46 the court easily surpasses the compelling interest
requirement only to stumble on the second requirement of narrowly
tailored means to meet the strict scrutiny standard.147 In its reasoning,
the court finds it suspect and circuitous to attempt to prevent sex crimes
by adding a layer of clothing, as opposed to the more narrowly tailored
method of imposing greater criminal and civil sanctions.148 The court
also suggests that to avoid strict scrutiny, other viable restrictions (e.g.
distance requirements between patrons and dancers, limited operation
hours, and zoning restrictions) 49 could be imposed that would be
viewed as content-neutral and thereby valid time, place, and manner
restrictions subject to the less stringent scrutiny found in O'Brien and
Clark.15o
Recently, the United States Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the PAP'S A.M. case back to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.'5' Despite what may have been a subversive attempt by the
Pennsylvania court at obtaining a definitive ruling on the issue of nude
or erotic dance, the Supreme Court regrettably could not reach a
majority opinion 52  In the plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor,
reemphasized the use of the four part content-neutral analysis from
such thoughts and ideas in the minds of the spectators may lead to increased
prostitution and the degradation of women. But generating thoughts, ideas, and
emotions is the essence of communication.
Id. at 279; see also Kimberly K. Smith, Comment Zoning Adult Entertainment: A Reassessment
of Renton, 79 CAL L. REV. 119, 143 (1991). Wherein the author states:
The perceived danger of sexual speech is not the view it espouses, but the words
or symbols themselves. Our emotional reaction to sexual speech, like our
reaction to the word 'huck,' stems not from the idea it expresses, but from the
violation of social taboos; it is a matter of cultural effrontery. There is a risk that
this emotional reaction will motivate excessive government censorship of all
discussion on the topic, regardless of the viewpoint expressed. Therefore, the
Court should be more, rather than less, suspicious of subject-matter restrictions
of sexual speech.
Id. (citations omitted).
11 The City of Erie's reliance on Barnes precluded it from including a strict scrutiny
analysis, thus forcing the court to decipher the problem on its own. PAP'S A.M., 719 A.2d
at 280.




1w See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text
131 City of Erie v. PAP'S A.M., 529 U.S. 277,286 (2000) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
12 See generally id. for the Justices' plurality, concurrin& and dissenting opinions.
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O'Brien, which was applied in Barnes, as the analysis to be used when
reviewing the protection afforded erotic dance. 5 3
Despite the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's attempt to redefine the
law through a rejection of Barnes, this landmark decision and the
methodology employed by it is nonetheless the current standard for
deciding issues involving erotic dance.1 4 However, in Barnes and both
PAP'S A.M. cases, only the restriction on public nudity is challenged as
unconstitutional.155 In all three opinions, other methods of regulating
adult use establishments are proposed as an alternative to a restriction
on nudity. 56 In the Lake County, Illinois, ordinance, these alternatives
are enacted as well as a restriction on nudity.157 The analysis that follows
will critique the individual restrictions imposed by the Lake County
ordinance under the current United States Supreme Court case law and
other lower court decisions. Additionally, this Note will analyze two
ordinances which qualify as cumulative ordinances.
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CUMULATIVE ORDINANCE
In analyzing restrictions on adult use ordinances, courts
consistently apply the content neutral analysis followed by the United
States Supreme Court. However, as previously discussed, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court favors a content based analysis due to its
different definition of erotic dance and the message it conveys.
Distinction between the two methods is irrelevant for purposes of this
Note as the analysis that follows will prove that regardless of the
methodology used, the cumulative ordinance fails to meet either
standard.
A. Individual Restrictions
Before analyzing the constitutionality of a cumulative adult use
ordinance, this Note will independently address nine of the individual
restrictions commonly used by local communities, including Lake
153 Id. at 1395 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
154 Despite the failure of PAP'S A.M. to follow the ruling from Barnes, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's approach to the issue is similar to that of United States Supreme Court
719 A.2d at 278-79.
155 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 565-66 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion); PAP'S A.M., 719 A.2d at 275-
76; PAP'S A.M., 529 U.S. at 289 (O'Connor, J,, plurality opinion).
1 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 594 (White, J., dissenting); PAP'S A.M., 529 U.S. at 315-16 (Souter, J.,
concurring); PAP'S A.M., 719 A.2d at 280.
157 See generally Lake County Ordinance, supra note 13.
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County, Illinois. lm5 These restrictions will be addressed in the following
order: restrictions on nudity, restrictions on the sale of alcohol at nude
dancing establishments, elimination of all physical contact between
patron and dancer, distance and separation requirements, restrictions on
the method of tipping, a limit to the hours of operation, a licensing
requirement, a limitation on the adult use establishment's signage, and
the establishment of adult entertainment zones. By presenting the
individual ordinances and reviewing the court's use of prior precedent,
the analysis of these individual restrictions will demonstrate that
municipalities are finding more and more creative ways to individually
regulate the adult use establishments concluding in the cumulative
ordinance.
1. Restrictions on Nudity
Regulation of nudity as an individual regulation is a relatively
simple analysis due specifically to the decision handed down in Barnes,
which rules on this exact issue.5 9 As previously discussed in Part II, the
analysis hinges on the validity of time, place, and manner restrictions
imposed on erotic dancing.16o Generally, most lower courts have
followed the high court's methodology when assessing the
constitutionality of the restrictions on public nudity by finding that
regulations prohibiting nudity are content-neutral restrictions subject to
valid time, manner, place restrictions. Somewhat concerning, however,
is the broad interpretation of Barnes followed by the enactment of more
restrictive ordinances in some jurisdictions.
In Caft 207 v. St. Johns County,161 the definition of what constitutes
nudity was expanded to include a larger portion of the breast and
buttocks.162 The court found no logical reason why G-strings and pasties
should constitute the maximum amount of coverage available in an adult
use ordinance.163 By expanding the current United States Supreme Court
15 Id.
19 See Barnes, 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
16 See supra Part I1; see also supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
161 856 F. Supp. 641 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
162 Id. at 643 ("One distinctive feature of the ordinance is its definition of the terms 'breast,'
'buttocks,' and 'nudity.' In net effect, a female is 'nude' whenever more than two-thirds of
the buttocks or more than three-fourths of the breasts are exposed....").
163 Id. at 646. The court noted:
Once it is established that a burden may be imposed on the expressive content of
erotic dancing by requiring some clothing-pasties and a G-string-then it does
not seem to me from a constitutional standpoint that a modest increase in the
2001] 585
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precedent to facilitate a more restrictive ordinance and deferring the
ultimate decision back to the United States Supreme Court, this court is
unknowingly promoting and facilitating the cumulative ordinance's
development and existence. 164
In Bright Lights, Inc. v. City of Newport,165 the court went one step
further by requiring erotic dancers to wear a bikini top.16 This court also
relied on Barnes and the content neutral test advanced by O'Brien.
However, in its application, the court cited moralistic and protectionist
reasons as the substantial government interest and thus found that the
bikini requirement was not greater than necessary. 167 In this instance,
the interests of fairness take a back seat to the court's interest in
supporting the local town council's attempts at cleaning up the city of
Newport despite the decision's judicial reverberations which
amount of body covering required by the law really adds any significant,
incremental burden on the expressive component of the dance.
id.
164 Instead of attacking the merits of the issue, this district court deferred to other courts for
interpretation of the unclear line deciding how much restriction constitutes too much
when it stated:
To be sure, so long as an anti-nudity statute is subject to any First Amendment
scrutiny. ... there must be a line in every case beyond which the law makers
cannot go in requiring clothing or prohibiting exposure in some
contexts... Definition of that constitutional line, however, must await a case-by-
case development of the law and further guidance from the [United States]
Supreme Court.
Id. at 646.
16 830 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. Ky. 1993).
1' The following represents the Bikini Ordinance as written by the city of Newport:
Sec. 4-81. Persons prohibited from performing nude or nearly nude activities.
It shall be unlawful for, and a person is guilty of, performing nude or nearly
nude activity when that person appears on a business establishment's premises
in such a manner or attire as to expose to view any portion of the pubic area,
anus, vulva or genitals, or any simulation thereof, or when any female appears
on a business establishment's premises, in such manner or attire as to expose to
view the portion of the breast below a horizontal line across the top of the areola
at its highest point or simulation thereof. This definition shall include the entire
lower portion of the human female breast, but shall not include any portion of the
cleavage of the human female breast, exhibited by a dress, blouse, shirt, leotard,
bathing suit, or other wearing apparel provided the areola is not exposed in
whole or in part.
Id. at 381 (emphasis added).
167 ld. at 383-M4.
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unknowingly invite and encourage cities to pass cumulative ordinances
in the future' 68
Notwithstanding the continued reliance on the United States
Supreme Court precedent, some lower courts have taken a closer look at
anti-nudity ordinances and the local community's reasons for passing
such ordinances. In J&B Entertainment, Inc. v. City of Jackson,169 the Fifth
Circuit vacated summary judgment in favor of the city due to the city's
failure to present clear evidence supporting how the secondary effects
furthered the city's interest of protecting the community. 170  This
decision shows that in some jurisdictions, local communities must
provide more than the mere indication of a proposed purpose to
withstand judicial scrutiny. In Nakatomi Investments, Inc. v. City of
Schenectady,"' the Northern District of New York also invalidated an
anti-nudity ordinance finding that the ordinance did not further a
substantial government interest. 72 Again, the court determined that in
order to pass the anti-nudity ordinance the city must make a strong
connection between the restrictions on erotic expression and the
underlying reason for passing the ordinance973 The court further found
that restrictions merely for the sake of preventing nudity at erotic dance
establishments was insufficient proof under the current United States
Supreme Court precedent 74 and, therefore, was unconstitutional. 175
168Id. at 384 (noting the court's conclusion that "[s]ome leeway must be afforded the reform
efforts of the City Council of Newport. This body has been elected by the citizens to
attempt to 'clean up the image' of the City").
M 152 F.3d 362 (5th Cir. 1998).
170 Id. at 374-75.
No explanation of what specific secondary effects motivate Jackson to enact the
ordinance appears in its text, and the City Council failed to make any specific
legislative findings prior to enactment .... Moreover, because the district court
granted summary judgment before the record was fully developed, the City did
not present evidence in court to demonstrate "a current governmental interest"
that might validate the Ordinance.
Id. at 374.
171 949 F. Supp. 988 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
',- Id. at 996-99.
17 Id. at 997.
174 Id. The courts stated:
What the District Court [in Cafi 207] and Justice Souter ignore, however, is that
the constitutional limitation is the requirement that the incremental restriction on
expression must result in an incremental furthering of the purported
governmental interest. To wit, each additional piece of required clothing must
result in a further reduction in pernicious side effects. Without demanding this
connection at each step, each additional layer of restriction can be legally added
simply on the basis that the previous restriction was valid, until the entire
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In defense of nude dancing and erotic expression, the Ninth
Circuit invalidated the county ban on nudity due to a lack of concrete
evidence linking the nude dance to the amount of crime in the same
area.176 This same case invalidated an adjacent county's ban on nudity
for similar reasons.177 The failure to recognize secondary effects as a
valid reason appears to be grounded more so on the fact that the two
counties ignored the First Amendment protection afforded erotic
dance.178 Nonetheless, this case is seemingly outdated, because refusal to
activity is banned: i.e. nude dancing is permitted so long as the dancers wear
pasties and G-strings; then bathing suits; then t-shirts; then long pants and a
sweater .... In recognition of the danger of creeping encroachment, the First
Amendment requires, not that the restriction be merely related to the
governmental interest asserted, but rather that each restriction imposed furthers
an important or substantial government interest.
Id.
17 Id. at 1000 ("Despite the city's laudable concerns, the ban at issue here does not fall
within any of these constitutionally permissible areas of legislation. If the city wishes to
regulate non-obscene expressive activity, it may do so, but only in consonance with the
First Amendment.").
176 BSA, Inc. v. King County, 804 F.2d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1986).
The Pierce County Sheriff presented testimony and data to the County Council
that were designed to show that the "soda pop" topless dancing clubs caused
and encouraged illicit activities such as prostitution, narcotics, and violence, and
therefore, such clubs had an added need for law enforcement services. The
sheriff provided statistics on the number of police calls to the topless clubs. The
data provided are [sic] not limited to calls to particular dubs, but include "the
immediate vicinity." The record indicates that the areas where these dubs are
located may be conducive to criminal activity by the combination of liquor
taverns, inexpensive motels, and topless dubs. No meaningful comparative
statistics are provided on hotels where prostitution occurs, or, the bars where
alcohol is served. The data on police calls to two taverns is of little assistance
given that there are fifty to seventy-five in the County. In sum, the County's
proof does not show that topless dancing is anymore a cause of lawlessness than
any of the other businesses.
Id. at 1108.
177 Id. at 1109.
Snohomish County has not shown a substantial governmental interest to justify
this ban on nude performances. Other than reports of several narcotics
transactions at one club, the evidence before the County Council consisted of
letters and petitions from church groups and ministers asserting that barroom
nude dancing is corrupt and immoral; a sheriff's statement that topless dancing
is perceived as vice-ridden, it corrupts public morals and is a drain on police
resources; and testimony of several individuals that topless dancing is immoral,
lewd, and degrading to womanhood. there are numerous biblical references. No
empirical evidence was presented to the Council.
Id.
178 Id. at 1107 ("The Counties contend that they can prohibit common barroom nude
dancing and other non-expressive nudity because it is afforded no protection under the
First Amendment.").
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allow secondary effects as a valid reason for restrictions on nude dancing
pre-dates the Cih of Renton v. Playtime Theaters79 decision which upholds
not only the use of statistical studies, but also the use of studies from
surrounding communities. 180
Despite the minor discrepancies between the courts as to the use of
secondary effects to restrict nudity, the forced draping of erotic dancers
appears to be constitutional on an individual basis.'8 ' Limiting nudity is
the first of many restrictions often used to eliminate adult use
establishments. Along with nudity, another common restriction
frequently addressed by the courts is a restriction on serving alcohol at
adult use establishments.
2. Restrictions on Distribution of Alcohol
In Toy Box, Inc. v. Bay Counhj,182 the Northern District of Florida
upheld the ban of alcohol sales at establishments that exhibit nude or
partially nude erotic dance.1 3 As part of its reasoning, this court relied
on the previous United States Supreme Court rulings in Barnes to uphold
this ordinance.184 Individually, a ban on the sale of alcohol would not
seem to conflict with the erotic message conveyed in the nude dance
unless it can be argued that alcohol enhances such erotic expression.Ies
The court found that because Barnes "squarely holds, a statute banning
IN 475 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1986) (upholding secondary effects as a compelling government
interest).
180 Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52.
1 See Smith, supra note 148, at 159 wherein the author notes:
The Renton test is appropriate for adult-use zoning ordinances
because, although they are content-based speech restriction, they
present less danger of censorship than other content-based restrictions.
Application of the test, however, raises considerable difficulties.
Zoning restrictions come in a multiplicity of forms; they may contain
waivers, grandfather clauses, and a variety of definitions. Correct
application of the Renton test, therefore, requires a dear
understanding of the first amendment issues implicated by adult-use
ordinances. In the absence of this understanding, the test will fail to
guard against censorship.
Id.
'8 989 F. Supp. 1183 (N.D. Fla. 1997).
w Id. at 1186.
"4 Id. at 1184-85.
1 The author contends that alcohol as a depressant puts the viewer in a more relaxed state
and thus makes them more receptive to the communicated message. As proof, see generally
PRINCIPLES OF AMBULATORY MEDICINE 224 (L. Randol Barker et al. eds., 4th ed. 1995)
("Alcohol intoxication may be characterized by ... relaxation and sedation, euphoria, [and]
... lowered inhibitions ... "Y
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public nudity in places where liquor is or is not used or sold survives
first amendment [sic] challenge, then the more limited ordinances at
issue in the case at bar, which ban public nudity only in places where
liquor is used or sold, also are constitutional." 186
In Sammy's of Mobile, Ltd. v. City of Mobile,87 the Eleventh Circuit
found a logical connection between the restriction of alcohol at an adult
use establishment and nudity when it stated, "explicit entertainment
coupled with alcohol in public places 'encourages undesirable behavior
and is not in the interest of public health, safety, and welfare. ' " 18 The
court also relied on the United States Supreme Court's reasoning that
"[clommon sense indicates that any form of nudity coupled with alcohol
in a public place begets undesirable behavior." 189 The Eleventh Circuit
argued that the restriction on serving alcohol has nothing to do with the
message conveyed in the symbolic speech present but more likely it is
aimed at preventing the harmful effects caused by the alcohol.19° This
again ignores the argument that when nudity and alcohol are combined
the effect is an enhanced erotic message.191 This argument, however,
would likely fail in the eyes of the United States Supreme Court.
Because the Court in Barnes failed to add significant value to the nude
component of erotic dance, it would hardly seem likely that alcohol
would fare any better.192
Individual regulations on the dancer and establishment have
continually been upheld as constitutional by the court system.
Purportedly, this is due to the court's ability to succinctly separate the
erotic message from the regulation being inflicted. The current support
for restrictions on nudity and the distribution of alcohol has lead to
further restrictions imposed to ban the ability of a dancer or performer to
contact or touch a patron.
3. Elimination of All Contact Between Patrons and Dancers
In Hang On, Inc. v. City of Arlington,193 the city council passed an
ordinance which forbade adult entertainers from touching the patrons,
16 Toy Box, Inc., 989 F. Supp. at 1184-85.
W17140 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 1998).
INd. at 997.
18 Id. (citing to New York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714,718 (1981)).
190 Id.
19 See supra note 188.
192 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 571 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion).
193 65 F.3d 1248 (5th Cir. 1995).
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affectionately called a "no touch ordinance." 194 The purpose of the
ordinance was "to promote the health, safety, morals and general
welfare of the citizens of the City."1' In its decision upholding the "no
touch" provision, the court accepted Barnes by acknowledging nude
dancing as an expressive form of communication. 9 6 However, it rejected
the notion that contact between a patron and an erotic dancer could
combine to enhance the erotic experience.197 Rather, the court viewed
the proscription on contact as just another valid time, place, or manner
restriction on nude dancing.198 The same ordinance was contested by
another local adult establishment in 2300, Inc. v. City of Arlington.99
Again, the contact between a dancer and a patron was dismissed as a
content neutral restriction of symbolic conduct' °0 However, this opinion
differed from Hang On, Inc. in that the court recognized touching as a
part of the expressive message conveyed by nude dancing.2M
Regardless of the difference in opinion as to whether a valid
connection exists between the erotic message and body contact, the mere
support of this individual restriction in both cases curtails the overall
nude dance experience through the elimination of interaction between
the dancers and the patrons. This restriction effectively reduces the
communicative impact of the nude-dancing medium by making it less
personal. If elimination of all contact between patrons and dancers is a
valid restriction on nude dancing the next logical step is the separation of
employees and the patrons through buffer zones and stage requirements.
19 Id. at 1251. The no touch provisions were as follows:
Section 5.01 Additional Regulations for Adult Cabaret
A. An employee of an adult cabaret, while appearing in a state of nudity,
commits an offense if he touches a customer or clothing of a customer.
B. A customer at an adult cabaret commits an offense if he touches an employee
appearing in a state of nudity or clothing of the employee.
Id.
19 Id.
16 Id. at 1253.
9 Id. ("[lUntentional contact between a nude dancer and a bar patron is conduct beyond the
expressive scope of the dancing itself.").
198 Interestingly enough, the court in finding that the ordinance met all four prongs of the
O'Brien test also noted that Arlington disclaimed any intent to infringe upon protected
expression. Hang On, Inc., 65 F.3d at 1254. By that logic, circumventing the First
Amendment would seemingly only require municipalities to disclaim themselves of any
fault in order to be free of constitutional infringement.
199 888 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. App. 1994).
" The Texas Appellate Court used precedent from Renton v. Playtime Theatres to support
the city council's goal of limiting secondary effects, "namely crimes such as prostitution,
drug trafficking and assault." Id. at 128.
2m The Texas Court of Appeals assimilates the touching with the total experience of nude
dancing and does not distinguish it as a separate component. Id. at 128-29.
2001]
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The rapid progression and court support of individual limitations on
adult use establishments provides further proof of the movement to a
cumulative ordinance.
4. Distance and Separation Requirements
A restriction requiring the dancers to be at least six feet away from
the patrons and on an eighteen-inch stage during their performances was
upheld as constitutional by the Sixth Circuit in DLS, Inc. v. City of
Chattanooga.20 2 The court again relied on current precedent when
analyzing this content-neutral restriction.203  Use of conclusive
independent studies by the local community provided sufficient proof
that a buffer zone between the patrons and dancers would limit the
opportunity for the harmful secondary effects intended to be curbed by
the restriction.204
In Colacurcio v. City of Kent,205 the city passed an ordinance that
required the dancers to perform on a stage at least two feet higher than
the seating area and be at least ten feet from any patron.206 The court
found the restriction to be both content-neutral and reasonable as to
time, manner, and place.20 7 However, a slightly different methodology
107 F.3d 403 (6th Cir. 1997). The ordinance stated:
No entertainer, employee or customer shall be permitted to have any physical
contact with any other [sic] on the premises during any performance and all
performances shall only occur upon a stage at least eighteen inches (18") above
the immediate floor level and removed at least six feet (6') from the nearest
entertainer, employee and/or customer.
Id. at 406.
2 Id. at 408-09.
2
m Proof of the use of a buffer zone to prevent harmful secondary effects was found and the
court stated:
An officer of the Chattanooga Health Department testified that such contact
poses a risk of the transmission of disease. Furthermore, the particular dances
described in the record-such as one instance in which a dancer invited customers
to spoon-feed themselves whipped cream off of her breasts, buttocks, and
vaginal area-pose a particularly acute risk of the transmission of disease.
Id. at 410.
163 F.3d 545 (9th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 549. The applicable sections of the ordinance state the following:
The portion of the exotic dance studio premises in which dancing and adult
entertainment by an entertainer is performed shall be a stage or platform at least
twenty four (24") inches in elevation above the level of the patron seating areas.
No dancing or adult entertainment by an entertainer shall occur closer than ten
(10") feet to any patron.
Id.
w7 Id. at 551-54.
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was used by the Ninth Circuit when it determined that the ordinance
was content-neutral and unrelated to the suppression of speech.2M
Traditionally, most courts would only look to the stated purpose in the
recitals of the ordinance to find a permissible purpose, whereas in this
case, the court performed a stricter examination, including a review of
such things as "the face of the statute, the effect of the statute,
comparisons to prior law, facts surrounding enactment, the state
purpose, and the record of proceedings." 2M Because the city could show
that considerable resources were devoted to establishing the right
restrictions, the court upheld it as justified without reference to the
speech.210
In DCR, Inc. v. Pierce County,211 the Washington state appellate
court came to a similar conclusion, except it made the argument that the
proximity of the dancer to the patron was completely unrelated to the
expressive component of the erotic dance.2 12 By separating the issue of
proximity from the expressive message conveyed by erotic dance, the
court was able to bar contact without interfering with the constitutional
protection afforded nude dancing as a whole.213 This logic lends itself to
the cumulative restriction analysis which is to follow. By analyzing each
individual restriction in a light which characterizes that component as a
small insignificant portion of the whole, the restrictions do not seem like
an infringement on the protected expression.
After placing numerous restrictions on dancers and their ability to
convey an erotic message (requiring G-strings and pasties, requiring
2 Id. at 552.
m Id.210 Colacuricio v. City of Kent, 163 F.3d 545, 553 (9th Cir. 1998). The court noted:
Kent's ordinance was based on a comprehensive study of adult entertainment
businesses and their secondary impacts. In formulating the ordinance, the City
relied on the study, concluding that regulation of adult uses was an important
factor in controlling prostitution, drug dealing, and other criminal activity ....
The record also includes affidavits and statements by police officers and vice
detectives documenting the connection between table dancing and illegal sexual
activity.
Id.
211 964 P.2d 380 (Wash. CL App. 1998).
212 DCR, Inc. v. Pierce County, 964 P.2d 380, 388 (Wash. Ci App. 1998) ("The 10-foot rule
minimizes opportunity for illegal activities, which are not protected conduct. But the 10-
foot rule does not restrict expressive content of the dance itself .. ") (citation omitted).
213 Id. at 387 ("The issue here is whether proximity of the erotic dance, as contrasted to the
movements of the dance, constitutes communicative 'expression' in the nature of
constitutionally protected speech, or whether it is unprotected mere conduct.") (emphasis
omitted).
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separation between the dancer and the patron, and disallowing
touching), the next place a municipality could attack would be the actual
business of running an adult use establishment, starting with a
restriction on tipping of dancers.
5. Restrictions on Tipping
In addition to a distance and separation requirement, Kent's
ordinance also prohibits dancers from soliciting or receiving tips from
patrons.214 The adult use establishment contended that a restriction
limiting dancer's revenue would make dancing "uneconomical and
therefore impossible for exotic dance studios to open and operate in [the
cityl." 21s The Ninth Circuit was not persuaded by this argument, instead
holding that the true test for overrestrictive regulations was "whether a
business could operate under the regulation at issue, not whether a
particular business will be able to compete successfully within the
market."216 The court's failure to consider the economic impact led to
further restrictions limiting adult use establishments such as restricting
the number of hours the establishment can stay open.
6. Limitation on the Hours of Operation
In 7250 Corp. v. Board of Countj Commissioner-7 and Ben Rich
Trading, Inc. v. City of Vineland,218 local communities passed ordinances
which restricted the hours of operation at adult use establishments. 9 In
7250 Corp., the Colorado Supreme Court utilized the four-part test
proposed by O'Brien to determine if a limit on hours was permissible. 22
Central to the court's decision to uphold the time restriction was its
reasoning that the ordinance was passed in furtherance of preventing
14Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 549.
2
's Id. The revenue from tipping is the main source of revenue for the dancers and therefore,
when the dancers are not compensated for stage dances, it results in an economic hardship.
Id. at 556. In essence, table dancers are independent contractors who pay rental fees to the
dance studio, effectively making up a majority of its revenues as well. Id. at 557.
216 Id. at 556-57 (emphasis omitted) ("]n the absence of any absolute bar to the market.. .it
is irrelevant whether '[a regulation] will result in lost profits, higher overhead costs, or
even prove to be commercially unfeasible for an adult business.'").
217 799 P.2d 917 (Colo. 1990).
218 126 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 1997).
219 In the first instance, hours were restricted to 4:00 pm to 1-00 midnight, Monday through
Saturday of each week 7250 Corp., 799 P.2d at 919. In the latter case, hours were limited to
8:00 am to 10:00 pm, Mondays through Saturdays. Ben Rich Trading, Inc., 126 F.3d at 158.
m 7250 Corp., 799 P.2d at 924.
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harmful secondary effects, including property destruction and criminal
activity. 221
In Ben Rich Trading, Inc., the Third Circuit found time restraints to
be content-neutral and not a burden that was substantially greater than
necessary to further the governments legitimate interest.2m In its opinion
upholding the time limits as allowable the court stated, "the [statute]
allows those who choose to hear, view, or participate publicly in sexually
explicit expressive activity more than thirty-six hundred hours per year
to do so. We think the Constitution requires no more."m In lieu of
limiting the number of hours, other communities have increased the
amount of hands-on regulation by requiring adult use establishments to
qualify for and to maintain an adult use license. 224
7. Licensing Requirements
Chattanooga, Tennessee, enacted an ordinance that required
owners and operators of adult cabarets to obtain a license in order to
continue to operate '225 Again, the court used the O'Brien analysis to
= Id. at 926 ("Adams County must rely upon the express terms of the Nude Entertainment
Ordinance as the method of preserving the character and quality of residential
neighborhoods within the county.").
" Ben Rich Trading, Inc., 126 F.3d at 162. The court used the approach proposed by Wardv.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989), which stated, "the principal inquiry in
determining content neutrality in speech cases generally and in time, place, and manner
cases in particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because
of disagreement with the message it conveys." Id. at 160-61.
m Id. at 163 (quoting Mitchell v. Comm'n on Adult Entr't, 10 F.3d 123, 139 (3d Cir. 1993)).
224 See infra notes 225 through 233 and accompanying text.
2z Broadway Books, Inc. v. Roberts, 642 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Tenn. 1986). The application for
a license required the following information:
(b) The application for a license shall be upon a form provided by the City
Treasurer. An applicant for a license including any partner or limited partner of
the partnership applicant, and any officer or director of the corporate applicant
and any stockholder holding more than five (5) percent of the stock of a
corporate applicant, or any other person who is interested directly in the
ownership or operation of the business, shall furnish the following information
under oath:
(1) Name and address, including all aliases.
(2) Written proof that the individual is at least eighteen (18) years of age.
(3) All residential addresses of the applicant for the past three (3) years.
(4) The applicant's height, weight, color of eyes and hair.
(5) The business, occupation or employment of the applicant for five (5) years
immediately preceding the date of the application.
(6) Whether the applicant previously operated in this or any other county, city
or state under an adult-oriented establishment license or similar business license;
whether the applicant has ever had such a license revoked or suspended, the
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determine if the restriction was constitutional.226 The majority of the
licensing requirements were upheld due to the city's attempts to curtail
harmful secondary effects, mainly health hazards and the spread of
sexually transmitted diseases, like Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome, which are often transmitted as a result of prostitution and
sexual improprieties.W
reason therefor, and the business entity or trade name under which the applicant
operated that was subject to the suspension or revocation.
(7) All criminal statutes, whether federal or state, or city ordinance violation
convictions, forfeiture of bond and pleadings of nolo contendere on all charges,
except minor traffic violations.
(8) Fingerprints and two (2) portrait photographs at least two (2) inches by two
(2) inches of the applicant.
(9) The address of the adult-oriented establishment to be operated by the
applicant.
(10) The names and addresses of all persons, partnerships, or corporations
holding any beneficial interest in the real estate upon which such adult-oriented
establishment is to be operated, including but not limited to, contract purchasers
or sellers, beneficiaries of land trust or lessees subletting to applicant.
(11) If the premises are leased or being purchased under contract, a copy of
such lease or contract shall accompany the application.
(12) The length of time the applicant has been a resident of the City of
Chattanooga, or its environs, immediately preceding the date of the application.
(13) If the applicant is a corporation, the application shall specify the name of
the corporation, the date and state of incorporation, the name and address of the
incorporation, the name and address of the registered agent and the name and
address of all principal shareholders, officers and directors of the corporation.
(14) A statement by the applicant that he or she is familiar with the provisions
of this ordinance and is in compliance with them.
(15) Written statements of at least five (5) persons who are not related to the
applicant that the applicant is of good moral character.
(16) All inventory, equipment, or supplies which are to be leased, purchased,
held in consignment or in any other fashion kept on the premises or any part or
portion thereof for storage, display, any other use therein, or in connection with
the operation of said establishment, or for resale, shall be identified in writing
accompanying the application specifically designating the distributor business
name, address, phone number, and representative's name.
Id. at 498-99.
226 Id. at 490-91.
The city of Chattanooga has cited the following:
These adult oriented establishments are a substantial law enforcement problem
for the Chattanooga Police Department - and particularly for its vice squad.
Since 1982, Chattanooga police officers have arrested numerous people at these
establishments for sex-related crimes such as prostitution, selling obscene
material to juveniles, indecent exposure, assignation, and solicitation to commit
an unnatural sex act There have been 112 such arrests since 1982. These are in
addition to numerous arrests at these establishments on other charges such as
gambling, assault and battery, and public drunkenness. Some of the arrests have
been of employees at these establishments including [Broadway Books']
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 3 [2001], Art. 4
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Similarly, in City of Colorado Springs v. 2354 Inc.,m the Colorado
Supreme Court upheld certain provisions of a licensing scheme that the
city imposed on adult use establishments. 229 The court analyzed the
licensing scheme as a prior restraint.2" Since prior restraints are invalid
per se, to prove the scheme was constitutional the City of Colorado
Springs had to provide adequate judicial procedural safeguards and
prove that the restriction serves a compelling government interest with
means narrowly tailored to meet that interest.231 In defense of the
licensing scheme, the Colorado Supreme Court found that conditioning
an erotic dance license on the age of its patrons and dancers was a
narrowly tailored means of protecting youths under the age of twenty-
one from potentially harmful consequences and was therefore valid.232
The other restrictions that the court upheld despite the strict scrutiny
standard included: time limits for approval or denial of applications,
regulation of managers and employees of licensed adult businesses,
establishments. On numerous occasions, plain-clothes police officers and others
at these places have been grabbed by the genitals or otherwise solicited for
homosexual activity.
Id. at 491.
2n 896 P.2d 272 (Colo. 1995).
229 Id. at 292 (upholding all provisions of licensing restrictions applied to nude dance
establishments except a provision requiring good moral character to obtain a license and a
provision requiring the identification of all corporate shareholders holding 5% or more of
the outstanding shares of stock).
230 Id. at 279 ("Because no alternative means of access to those ideas are available, the
licensing provisions of the Ordinance constitute a prior restraint that subjects certain
communications to governmental regulation in advance of the time that such
communications are to occur.").
231 Id. at 279; see also Smith, supra note 148, at 152, noting:
The crucial difference between a licensing statute and a zoning ordinance is the
discretion vested in the permitting authority. Licenses may be denied on the
basis of the permitting authority's distaste for the applicant's message, rather
than a legitimate non-speech-related reason. Any regulation that leaves the right
to free speech as a discretionary matter carries the potential for government
censorship. Courts have guarded against the danger of censorship by
discretionary licensing statutes by requiring such statutes to include extensive
procedural safeguards. For the same reasons, a zoning ordinance vesting
discretion in the permitting authority should be subject to these safeguards.
Id.
City of Colo. Springs v. 2354 Inc., 896 P.2d 272,287 (Colo. 1995); see also 7250 Corp. v. Bd.
of County Comm'rs, 799 P.2d at 917,926 (Colo. 1990), which stated:
Furthermore, in light of the evidence concerning reported property destruction
and criminal activity associated with nude entertainment establishments, we
may reasonably presume that the age restrictions in the ordinance reflect a
legitimate legislative judgment by the county commissioners that youths under
21 years of age should be protected from the potentially harmful consequences
associated with such establishments.
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periodic inspection of premises, and factors warranting suspension,
revocation and expiration of issued licenses.3 In addition to finding it
constitutional to regulate the adult use establishments hours of operation
and to require those establishments to obtain licenses, municipalities
found other ways to impose individual regulations, including a
limitation on the amount of signage the business was able to display.
8. Limitations on the Adult Use Establishment's Signage
The court upheld a limitation on the number and type of signage
displayed at an adult use establishment in SDJ, Inc. v. City of Houston.2M
The ordinance was drafted to require "that the exterior portions of
establishment be free from flashing lights, words, lettering, photographs,
silhouettes, drawings, or pictorial representations and, with few
exceptions, the exterior portions of the establishment must be painted a
single achromatic color." 23 The district court upheld these restrictions,
reasoning that the regulations were directed at the signs themselves and
not the protected activity.236 As if it recognized the flaw in this
reasoning, the court supported its decision by finding that the
restrictions served a legitimate public interest and where appropriate, to
prevent the deterioration and decline of the surrounding properties.237
Furthermore, because it was not a complete ban on the businesses'
signage, the court allowed the restriction.mg Finally, in addition to the
numerous individual restrictions on the dancers and the adult use
facilities, the local communities and county boards have relied on
commercial zoning restrictions to further regulate the impact of erotic
dancing on their communities.
23 2354 Inc., 896 P.2d at 277.
2N 636 F. Supp. 1359, 1369 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
w Id.
M Id. True to form, the courts continue to separate the restricted activity from the erotic
expression thereby eliminating the need to justify the restriction. Id.
237 The mere suggestion that signage restrictions aimed at adult use establishments were
not caused by the protected activity within prompted the secondary effects justification
from the court. Id.
2 Id. The court further reasoned:
A restriction on the signage and exterior portions which allows modest, subdued
advertising is appropriate in order to prevent a decline in the values of
surrounding properties, and thus prevent deterioration of neighborhoods ....
Unlike the [o]rdinance in [another case], The City of Houston Ordinance does not
completely ban topless bars from advertising. It merely places limits on the
number, size, and details of the signs. Regulations on the exterior portions and
signage of sexually oriented businesses that serve a legitimate public interest,
such as the prevention of detrimental effects on minors, are not unconstitutional.
Ido at 1369.
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9. Restrictions on Location through Zoning
Limiting the location of adult use establishments through zoning
laws is the final individual restriction to be addressed. In Nakatomi
Investments, Inc. v. City of Schenectady, 39 the city passed an ordinance that
required the adult use establishment to obtain a zoning permit
authorizing the existence of the entertainment establishment. 24° To
obtain such a permit, the placement of the adult use establishments had
to be at least 500 feet from a dwelling unit, 500 feet from any other adult
use establishment, 500 feet from any church or place of worship, and
1000 feet from any public, private or parochial school, library, park or
playground. 241 In analyzing the constitutionality of such a zoning
requirement, the court relied on the test used by the United States
Supreme Court case in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres.242 To pass
constitutional muster under City of Renton, the government's interest in
regulating these establishments has to be substantial and reasonable
alternative avenues of communication must be available. 24 Due to the
lack of an adequate record, the court was unable to determine if
Schenectady's ordinance allowed the reasonable alternative avenues
proscribed by Renton and thus, it found that there was little likelihood of
a successful challenge to this ordinance.2 " However, due to the permit
requirements imposed in addition to the zoning requirements, the court
found the ordinance to be a prior restraint and therefore
unconstitutional.245
239 949 F. Supp. 988 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
240 Id. at 1000 n.7.
241 Id.; see also infra note 247 for another example of a zoning ordinance.
242 475 U.S. 41, 43 (1986) (upholding a zoning restriction prohibiting a movie theater from
locating within 1000 feet of any residential zone, single or multiple family dwellings,
church, park, or school).
243 Id. at 50, 53; Nakatoni Invs., Inc., 949 F. Supp. at 1002.
244 Nakatorni hivs., Inc., 949 F. Supp. at 1002. Inconsistent with the required test, the court
ignored the substantial government interest prong altogether assuming the prevention of
crime and the goal of maintaining the quality of the city's neighborhoods was a substantial
government interest Id.
245 Id. at 1003. In so holding, the court reasoned:
In determining the constitutionality of a permit ordinance, a court must move
beyond the Renton and O'Brien tests and deal with the issue of prior restraints.
Unlike the zoning ordinance at issue in Renton, which merely required set
distances between adult establishments, and unlike the Indiana statute at issue in
Barnes, which banned public nudity, a conditional use ordinance acts as a prior
restraint on speech; a permit scheme qualifies as a prior restraint because it
essentially requires the permittee to obtain the government's permission or
approval before engaging in an act of First Amendment protected speech ....
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A similar fate befell a zoning ordinance passed by St. Petersburg,
Florida, in Centerfold Club, Inc. v. City of St. Petersburg.246 In this case,
however, the key analysis centered on the availability of alternative
avenues of communication. 247 This decision was reached mainly because
Accordingly, a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the
prior restraint of a license or permit must be declared unconstitutional unless it
contains narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing
authority.
Id. at 1002-03. Due again to the lack of an adequate record, the court found it could not
determine if the Schenectady ordinance contained a narrow objective and thus it found for
the plaintiff. Id. at 1003.
26 969 F. Supp. 1288 (M.D. Fla. 1997). The ordinance stated:
Section (e) of the Ordinance describes the "Location of Adult Uses":
(1) No adult use establishment may be located within 700 feet of any of the
following uses which is legally in existence or has received legal authority to
locate on a lot or parcel: a. any property within a residential district; b. any
portion of a mixed use zoning district developed and utilized as a nonaccessory
residential use; or c. any church, school child care facility or public park;
(2) No adult use establishment may be located within 700 feet of any other
adult use establishment which is legally in existence or has received legal
authority to locate on a lot or parcel.
(3) Neither the residential districts described in subparagraph (1)a. nor any of
the uses described in subparagraphs (1)b. or c. may be located within 700 feet of
any adult use establishment which is legally in existence or has received legal
authority to locate on a lot or site. Such legal authority shall be presumed where
there is a valid certificate of compliance or adult use permit for the adult use
establishment on the lot or site.
(4) The distance requirements under section (1), (2) and (3) above shall be
measured along a straight line from the nearest property line within a residential
district or the nearest property line of the church, school, child care facility,
public park, residential use in a mixed use zoning district or adult use to the
closest property line of the adult use. In a multi-tenant or multi-user building,
such as a shopping center, said distance requirement shall be measured from the
unit or dosest portion of the building, unit or structure utilized by and
containing or being utilized by any facet of the adult use establishment.
(5) Nothing in this Section shall be construed to permit the operation of any
business or the performance of any activity prohibited under any other part of
this Section, state or county law, other ordinance of the City or the City Code.
Additionally, nothing in this Section shall be construed to authorize, allow or
permit the establishment of any business, the performance of any activity, or the
possession of any item, which is obscene under the judicially established
definition of obscenity.
Id. at 1299 n.15.247 Id. at 1302. The court stated:
We are therefore not particularly concerned with determining how much acreage
was actually available .... What is important is the number of adult business
locations that the acreage will support given the spacing requirements. That is
what determines whether there are sufficient alternative sites available, and that
is our focus in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.
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the number of sites in comparison to the community's population was
severely inadequate. 248 While these two previous cases demonstrate that
a poorly drafted ordinance will fail, Renton allows these restrictions as
long as they meet the requirements from the two-part test previously
discussed.249
In short, numerous types of restrictions covering regulation of the
dancer and the adult use establishments have been held to be
constitutional. Next, this Note will analyze two cumulative ordinances
to demonstrate how courts analyze a combined ordinance which
imposes numerous individual restrictions on the adult use
establishment.
B. Cumulative Restrictions
A cumulative ordinance adopted by the city of Chattanooga
combined four of the previously discussed individual restrictions by
requiring a ban on touching, a six foot buffer zone between the patron
and the dancer, performance on a stage eighteen inches higher than
viewing area, and a licensing scheme.250 The Sixth Circuit chose to
address only two parts: the six-foot buffer zone requirement and the
licensing scheme. 251 Despite the plaintiffs challenge of "virtually every
248 The court stated:
Although there is no bright line rule for making this determination, the Court
finds the relationship between the number of available sites and the population
of the community important .... St. Petersburg... has a population of 238,726,
creating a ratio of one site per 12,565. In comparison [to other city's ratios] the
City of St. Petersburg's ratio is inadequate.
Id. at 1305-06.
249 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986) ("[Tlhe appropriate
inquiry in this case, then, is whether the Renton ordinance is designed to serve a
substantial government interest and allows for reasonable alternative avenues of
communication."); see also Smith, supra note 148, at 146-47 which stated:
The limited scope of adult-use zoning ordinances prevents them from effectively
censoring sexual speech, regardless of the community's desire to do so. Because
these restrictions do not pose the same risk of censorship as most content-based
restrictions, and because the Renton test adequately addresses the risks such
restrictions do pose, it is unnecessary to subject them to strict scrutiny.
Moreover, the importance of a city's interest, in comparison to the minimal
burden a restriction imposes on speech, justifies a relaxed standard of review.
Id.
2s DLS, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 107 F.3d 403,406 (6th Cir. 1997). A previous version of
this ordinance was contested in Broadway Books, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 642 F. Supp.
486 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), which is discussed previously by this Note. See supra notes 226
through 228 and accompanying text.
21 DLS, Inc., 107 F.3d at 408.
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paragraph, jot and title," the court was silent on a majority of the
challenges, including the eighteen inch stage requirement and the no
touching portion of the ordinance. 252
In its analysis, the court defended the six-foot buffer zone portion
of the ordinance by using the Barnes/O'Brien test.253 The court found that
the first and second prongs of this test were satisfied, as the plaintiff
(DLS, Inc.) appeared to concede that the prevention of crime and disease
were within the government's power and the ordinance furthered an
important or substantial government interest.254
The third prong of O'Brien was justified by relying on Justice
Souter's statement in Barnes, that "on its face, the governmental interest
in combatting prostitution and other criminal activity is not at all
inherently related to expression." 5 The final prong was also found to
be satisfied as the court found the six-foot buffer zone not substantially
greater than necessary to achieve the city's interest in the prevention of
crime and disease. 2- In so holding, the court justified its position by
stating, "[W]e are mindful that a regulation of speech must be narrowly
tailored to serve the government's legitimate, content-neutral interests
but that it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of
doing so." 257 Individually, the distance restriction was found to be
constitutional, which is consistent with the other cases analyzed above.258
The second part of the decision analyzed the constitutionality of
the licensing and permit procedures.259 After finding that the plaintiffs
2 Id. at 408 ("Plaintiffs have continued the shotgun approach on appeal, firing conclusory
arguments haphazardly, in the hope that some part of the ordinance may be crippled.").
The court completely failed to consider the fact that touching was a valid component of the
erotic message conveyed by nude dance and therefore its analysis made little mention of
the no touch provision. Id. at 412-13.
2/ld. at 410; see also snpra note 65 and accompanying text.
2N DLSo Inc., 107 F.3d at 410.
M ld. at 411.
2
m/d. at 412.
257 Id. The court also stated, "[s]o long as the means chosen are not substantially broader
than necessary to achieve the government's interest, however, the regulation will not be
invalid simply because a court concludes that the government's interest could be
adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative." Id.
m See generally Part W.A.
3 DLS, Inc., 107 F.3d at 413. The licensing and permit process requires three substantive
requirements:
[The applicant: (1) must be at least eighteen years of age; (2) must not have been
convicted of or pleaded nolo contendere to a felony or any crime involving moral
turpitude, prostitution, obscenity, or other crime of a sexual nature within the
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had standing to file a lawsuit, the court found no violation of First
Amendment rights. ° In its opinion upholding the ordinance, the court
focused on the inability of city officials to "exercise discretion by passing
judgment on the content of the protected speech," as well as the objective
criteria constraining the ordinance and restricting the decision makers.261
Although the ordinance was cumulative in nature, the Sixth
Circuit chose to analyze each part individually, thus allowing it to pass
constitutional muster.262 By addressing the restrictions individually, the
court ensured that the result would not "burden substantially more
speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate
interests."263 But this approach is flawed because it ignores the total
impact of the cumulative ordinance on the erotic message conveyed by
the dance. By separating the ordinance into pieces, it is easier for the
courts to justify each piece as a valid restraint. Taken as a whole, the
restriction would appear to place substantially more restrictions on the
speech than is required to combat the issue at the heart of the
municipality's complaint: the harmful secondary effects of these
establishments. By separating the ordinance, each prong can be found to
be no more necessary than required to meet the government's interest
and not infringe on speech.
The second cumulative ordinance to be analyzed involves
substantially more regulation through the use of a cumulative ordinance
than the DLS, Inc. case. In 1999, the City of Brunswick, Ohio, passed an
even more comprehensive ordinance, placing substantial limitations on
adult use establishments which included a licensing scheme, mandatory
inspections, zoning restrictions, limitations on the hours of operation, a
ban on appearing in a state of nudity, a ten-foot distance and two-foot
stage requirement, a restriction on tipping performers, and restrictions
on touching while in a semi-nude state. 264 To determine the validity of
this ordinance and the potential for a preliminary injunction, the court
relied on four factors: (1) whether there is a substantial likelihood or
past five years; and (3) must not have been found to have violated the ordinance
within the past five years.
Id. at 414.
m Id.
261 Id. at 414-15.
w Id. at 415.
Id. at 412.
26 See generally J.L Spoons, Inc. v. City of Brunswick, 49 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
This cumulative ordinance was passed in response to a prior Brunswick ordinance which
was found facially overbroad and in violation of the First Amendment. Id. at 1037 n.2
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probability of success in the merits, (2) whether there is a threat of
irreparable harm to the plaintiff, (3) whether issuance of the injunction
would cause substantial harm to others, and (4) whether the public
interest would be served by granting injunctive relief.20 Under the first
prong of this four-part test, the court analyzed the plaintiff's likelihood
of success on the merits by attacking the ordinance in its individual
parts.2"
Initially the court attacked the licensing scheme, and in doing so,
found that it contravened the requirements of the First Amendment.26 7
The court found that the scheme was problematic because it conditioned
the license upon receiving the County Health Department's consent
within a 30-day period. 23 The scheme also failed to provide prompt
judicial review or appellate procedures. 269 Likewise, the court found the
mandatory search provision in the licensing scheme to be
unconstitutional due to the Fourth Amendment concerns involved.2 0
The zoning portion of the ordinance was summarily dismissed by
the court as unlawful.2 ' In its brief analysis on this issue, the court
found that the zoning ordinance was in conflict with the Ohio
Constitution as well as the Ohio Revised Code, due to the ordinance's
retroactive nature.272 Despite arguments from the city that the zoning
ordinance was actually a licensing requirement, the court found it
Ms Id. at 1037-38.
2See id. at 1038-46.
27 Id. at 1039.
m]6.L. Spoons, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d at 1038. The court found that allowing a 30 day window
for city approval which was conditioned upon a County operated department was unfair
due to the low probability of attaining that County certificate within the allotted time
frame. Id.
2 Id. at 1039. Allowing a civil lawsuit as the only means of judicial review did not
constitute the proper method for allowing prompt review or appeal of the city's decision to
issue a license. Id.
270 Id. at 1039-40 ("Administrative searches are significant intrusions upon the interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment, and generally require that a government official
possess 'a substantially restricted' search warrant.").
m Id. at 1041.
mlId. The ordinance stated:
Section 12(H) reads as follows: Any sexually oriented business lawfully
operating on the date of passage of this ordinance that is in violation of
subsection A through F of this Section shall be permitted to continue for a period
not to exceed one year, unless sooner terminated for any reason or voluntarily
discontinued for a period of thirty (30) days or more. Such nonconforming uses
shall not be increased, enlarged, extended, or altered except that the use may be
changed to a conforming use.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 3 [2001], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol35/iss3/4
2001] TO STRIP OR NOT TO STRIP 605
unconstitutional.2 3 The provision restricting the hours of operation was
also found to contravene state law and was thus determined to violate
the plaintiff's rights.274
The next section of the ordinance discussed by the district court
was the ban on nudity.m This restriction was not only analyzed by
using the four part O'Brien test in conjunction with Barnes, but also by
utilizing an overbreadth analysis.276 Relying on the government's power
to pass ordinances aimed at the prevention of crime and disease, the
court found that this restriction met the first, second, and third prongs of
the O'Brien analysis.2' Likewise, relying on Barnes, the court found that
the restriction on nudity did not burden the speech in a way
substantially broader than necessary because "the limitation is minor
when measured against the dancer's remaining capacity and
opportunity to express the erotic message."2 '= The overbreadth
challenge was dismissed due to the inability of the adult use
establishment to show the restriction was substantially overbroad.V9
Because they were contained as subsections to the nudity
restriction, the remaining three regulations of distance and stage
requirements, limitations on tipping, and limitations on touching were
all briefly discussed under the fourth prong of the O'Brien test.38 The
2n I.L. Spoons, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d at 1041.
274 Id. at 1042 ("[When a local ordinance 'restricts an activity which a state license permits,
the ordinance is in conflict with a general law of the state and violates... the Ohio
Constitution."').
M.L. Spoons, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d at 1042
276 Id. at 1043-44.
2m, d. at 1044. The court stated:
Applying [the O'Brien] analysis to the case at bar, there is no dispute that
promulgation of the ordinance, and § 16 in particular, is within the City's police
powers. With respect to the second and third prongs of the O'Brien test, it is
evident that the City is concerned with the harmful secondary effects of sexually
oriented businesses .... In light of Barnes, then, § 16 of the ordinance satisfies the
second and third requirements of O'Brien.
Id. (citation omitted).
2m Id. at 1045 (quoting Barnes, 501 U.S. at 587).
27 I. at 1045.
] .L. Spoons, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d. at 1044.
The fourth O'Brien condition.., is satisfied so long as the regulation is "narrowly
tailored." That is, § 16 must promote the City's interest in curbing harmful
secondary effects, and may not result in a burden on speech that is substantially
broader than necessary to achieve the City's goal. This court finds it is
appropriate to assess each sub-part of § 16 separately for compliance with the
fourth prong of O'Brien.
Id. (citations omitted).
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ten-foot buffer zone was found unconstitutional because the distance
when combined with a two-foot stage requirement was greater than
necessary to support a secondary effects attack.281 Finally, the limitation
on tipping and the no touch restriction are both found constitutional as
they were both narrowly tailored to combat the adverse secondary
effects associated with erotic dance.2
Interestingly enough, these final three restrictions were not subject
to the individual critique of prongs one, two, and three under the O'Brien
test. 83  Presumably, the court forewent the formality to save time;
however, in support of this Note, the court unknowingly engaged in a
cumulative analysis of the four restrictions. In general, as past
discussions of individual restriction have shown, the individual
ordinances will satisfy the first three prongs of the O'Brien test.8
. The first prong requiring the regulation to be within the
constitutional power of the government is always justified under the
particular state's constitution. The second prong requiring the
furtherance of an important or substantial government interest is met by
drafting the ordinance to combat the negative secondary effects
associated with adult use establishments, including sexual assaults and
the deterioration of property values and health risks. The third prong
requiring the government interest to be unrelated to the suppression of
free expression is skirted by claiming the restriction is a content-neutral
limitation that is more concerned with the secondary effects than the
restriction of speech. However, this case demonstrates that the prong
most likely to fail under the O'Brien test is the fourth prong, which
requires that the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms be no greater than was essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
Using a cumulative approach, those portions of the ordinance that
are greater than essential to further the government interest should be
dropped, thereby leaving a valid ordinance that facilitates the removal of
harmful secondary effects while not overly burdening the speech. Too
often, the motive of cities is not to regulate the speech, but instead to
281 Id. at 1045-46.
M Id. at 1046 ("Section 16(C) [forbidding tipping] bans conduct rather than speech; it
prohibits the exchange of money or the initiation of such an exchange. Such a restriction
directly targets the City's interest in preventing prostitution.").
2d. at 1044.
2N See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 3 [2001], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol35/iss3/4
2001] TO STRIP OR NOT TO STRIP 607
eliminate the adult use establishments.8 5 By modifying the analysis of
restrictions from an individual approach to a cumulative approach the
courts can sufficiently guard against the ordinances that are overly
burdensome.
The United States Supreme Court will generally not strike down a
governmental action for failure to leave open ample alternative channels
of communication, unless the government enactment will foreclose an
entire medium of public expression across the landscape of a particular
community.n6 In reality the elimination of the entire medium is the goal
and the final effect of passing these ordinances.2v By drafting these
cumulative ordinances, municipalities are forcing these establishments
out of business. Ironically, once all adult use establishments are
eliminated from a certain area due to the inability to operate under the
cumulative restrictions, a new establishment could arguably sprout up
and have the ordinance overturned due to a lack of existing conduits for
erotic expression; thereby repeating the cycle.
In both DLS, Inc. and J.L. Spoons, Inc. the courts analyzed
individual portions of the ordinances using a content neutral analysis
2"In support of the notion that ordinances are passed merely to eliminate the businesses,
see David Templeton, Legal Scuffles Just Beginning: Ordinance to Control Adult Fare is Passed;
Raises Company's Ire, PrrirSBURGH Posr-GAzETrE, Mar. 1, 1998, at Metro, available at 1998 WL
5235765, which states:
Janavitz [attorney for proprietor of adult bookstore) said Highway News Adult
Bookstore, which has operated for 23 years at the Kammerer exit, has never
created problems for the community. That's particularly true, [Janavitz] said,
because it's located along a desolate stretch of 1-70. And that would hold true for
the nude dancing business [now operating in the bookstores place].
"What secondary effects have happened there?" Janavitz asked. "It's in the
middle of nowhere - on an off-ramp. It might as well be in the middle of the
Gobi Desert. This might be the highest and best use for that property.
If people were dying as a result of the store being there, I suggest that they
would have evidence of it after 23 years," he said. "Ultimately, the proof is in the




6 See Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 555.
w When drafting adult use ordinances, municipalities often ignore the specific community
problem to be addressed and copy the language from previously litigated cases to avoid
judicial review. See Kristen Hays, U.S. Supreme Court to Consider Nude-Dancing Issue with
Erie Case, ASSOCIATED PREss NEWSWIRES, Nov. 8, 1999, which displays one attorney's
surprise at the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's failure to follow United States Supreme
Court precedent when he states, "We took the language of [Indiana's statute upholding a
ban on nudity] and adapted it almost verbatim for our nudity-public indecency law." Id.
(emphasis added).
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from Barnes. On the whole, it would appear that in a content-based
scenario the cumulative ordinance would fail due to the communities
inability to use the least restrictive means available to meet the
compelling government interest. If the government's goal is to prevent
sexual assaults and the crime of prostitution, then restrictions on nudity
and the dancer in general should be enforced. Alternatively, if the
concern is other crimes and the reduction of property value, then the
regulations should focus on the establishment itself such as limitations
on hours, zoning, and signage restrictions. The combination of the two
government concerns into one compelling interest makes it difficult to
tailor the restriction to the specific concern because of the multitude of
other more narrowly tailored means available for such a large
compelling interest.
While it seems justified to attack these ordinances individually, it
would seem more appropriate to analyze the ordinance cumulatively.
The underlying purpose of these ordinances is to attack and eliminate
nude or erotic dancing under the guise of eliminating secondary effects.
To an extent, local communities should be allowed to regulate and
restrict some of the activities at adult use establishments as long as the
erotic message is not muted. Cumulative regulation should be reviewed
with caution to ensure that the purpose of the community's ordinance is
not to completely eradicate these establishments but rather to improve
the quality of living in the surrounding community. Despite the
common distaste for erotic expression, it is recognized as a form of
speech and should therefore receive adequate protection under the First
Amendment against these cumulative ordinances.
V. THE EXAMINATION OF A CUMULATIVE ORDINANCE AND
THE PROPOSAL OF A MODEL STATUTE
This Note contends that cumulative adult use ordinances
restricting erotic dancing are unconstitutional. To support this
contention, this section will show through model judicial reasoning how
the Lake County, Illinois adult use ordinance fails to pass constitutional
muster under both a content-based and a content-neutral analysis. In
addition to this analysis, this Note will propose an alternative statute
which will increase the penalty for committing a criminal act in the
vicinity of an adult use establishment.
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A. Model Judicial Reasoning
1. Content-Based Analysis
In a content-based analysis, the regulation or restriction must meet
a compelling government interest with means that are narrowly tailored
to meet that interest.2m As shown by the judicial reasoning employed in
PAP'S A.M., the problems normally do not occur when finding a
compelling government interest, but rather when the government body
is attempting to narrowly tailor the restriction to meet the compelling
government interest.28 9
The Lake County ordinance begins with three pages of recitals,
which detail the reasons for enacting this ordinance.290 In these recitals,
the county cites every conceivable reason for drafting an adult use
ordinance, ranging from the more concrete reason of preventing crime
and disease to the more hollow reason of preventing the negative
perception of neighboring businesses and preventing the adverse impact
of adult advertising on young people and students.291 Arguably, most of
2 PAP'S A.M., 719 A.2d at 279.
2 Id. at 280 ("The most compelling government interest which could be articulated in
connection with the Ordinance is the interest in deterring sex crimes.").
m Lake County Ordinance, supra note 13, at 1-3 (unpublished ordinance, on file with
author).
m Id. at 2. Lake County indicates that the negative perception "quickly can lead to... a
decline and deteriorat[ion], prompting businesses and residents to flee the affected area to
avoid the consequences of such decline and deterioration." Id. It then takes a paternalistic
approach by stating "the exterior appearance, including signage, of Sexually Oriented
Business Activities can have an adverse impact on minors and students." Id. Both of these
recitals tend to ignore the societal change in values over the last decade resulting in a more
liberal attitude toward sex and sexual related activities. Such things as condom
commercials on prime time radio, sultry Victoria Secret underwear advertisements on
prime time television, and partial nudity on network television programming support this
notion; see also Rutman, supra note 6, at 516-17 noting:
The growth in the [adult entertainment] industry, however, seems more closely
linked to the infiltration of pornography and other sexually explicit material into
popular culture. The porn industry is now being used as a vehicle for promoting
consumer items and raising movie and television ratings. The popularity of
Hollywood movies such as Boogie Nights, Striptease, Showgirls, and The People
v. Larry Flynt illustrates the cultural fascination with porn stars and adult
entertainers. Some clothing lines have recently begun using porn actresses as
models because the industry is being recognized as a unique advertising
technique. Adult entertainers are now being hired as actresses in mainstream
Hollywood movies and television shows. Playboy models Pamela Anderson,
Jenny McCarthy, and Carmen Electra successfully made the transition from
being adult entertainment models to mainstream actresses and television show
hostesses.
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the reasons mentioned qualify as a compelling government interest;
however, are these restrictions narrowly tailored to specifically address
each of the compelling interests proposed?
Again, when viewed individually, the correct restriction can be
matched up with the proper compelling interest. Zoning, licensing,
restrictions on serving alcohol and limitations on hours could provide
reasonable restraints on the adult use establishments by controlling the
overall operation of those businesses. Additionally, restricting nudity,
contact, and tipping could potentially reduce the sexual desire of patrons
by dulling the erotic component of the dance, thereby reducing sexual
attacks and prostitution. However, when viewed in totality as a
cumulative ordinance, the regulation fails.
By imposing such a broad range of constraints, the intent of the
county board becomes clear: to eliminate the erotic dance medium. And
because of this attempt to foreclose the entire medium of erotic dance
across the landscape of Lake County, it is unlikely that the United States
Supreme Court would uphold such an ordinance.292
2. Content-Neutral Analysis
To analyze the Lake County ordinance in conjunction with the
current United States Supreme Court precedent of using a content
neutral analysis, this Note will apply the O'Brien test to the ordinance as
a whole.293 Under the O'Brien test, in order for the government to justify
the regulation, it must have the constitutional power to pass such a
regulation, the regulation must further an important or substantial
government interest, it must be unrelated to the suppression of free
expression, and the restriction imposed must be no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of the interest.294 As proven by the prior
analysis on individual ordinances, critiquing the various restrictions of
an ordinance individually results in the restriction often standing up to
judicial scrutiny.2 The question, once again, is how will the ordinance
fare on the whole?
The first prong of the O'Brien test requiring the governmental
entity to have the constitutional power is plainly met. As stated in the
Id.
m See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
2" Bantes, 501 U.S. at 566; see also supra note 65 and accompanying text.
m O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
2
" See supra notes 162 through 250 and accompanying text.
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recitals, Lake County clearly has the power and authority pursuant to
"its general police powers to protect the public health, safety, morals and
general public welfare, the provisions... of the Counties code..., and all
other applicable provisions of law." 2 6
The second and third prongs of O'Brien test require that the
regulation must further an important or substantial government interest
and be unrelated to the suppression of free expression, respectively. 29
The first of these prongs can be summarily dismissed, because it is clear
from the recitals that the main purpose of the ordinance is to further the
county's interest in protecting the population from crime, disease and
moral impropriety.2  The second of these two prongs can also be
dismissed as the county clearly states that its purpose in passing such an
ordinance is to address the secondary effects associated with the adult
use establishments and not to suppress speech. 2' 9 The crucial part of this
cumulative analysis occurs when analyzing the fourth prong of the
O'Brien test.
The fourth prong of the O'Brien test requires that the restriction
imposed be no greater than is essential to further the interest of the
government. 3° The analysis is similar to the analysis utilized by the
court in J.L. Spoons, Inc. when, in the interests of convenience, it
inadvertently analyzed four portions of the adult use ordinance
together.301  Taken cumulatively, the ordinance places numerous
restraints on both the performer and the adult entertainment
establishment. These restraints cover every aspect of the business from
2%Lake County Ordinance, see supra note 13, at 3.
29See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
2 Lake County Ordinance, supra note 13, at 2 ("WHEREAS, the Chairman and Members of
Lake County Board have determined that Sexually Oriented Business Activities will, unless
properly regulated, have these and other severe adverse impacts and secondary effects on
the County and its residents.").
m Id. at 3. The ordinance clearly states:
WHEREAS, the regulations established pursuant to this Ordinance are in no way
based on the content of the protected speech, if any, associated with Sexually
Oriented Business Activities, and the purpose and intent of the regulations
established pursuant to this Ordinance is not to restrict or prohibit protected
speech, if any, associated with Sexually Oriented Business Activities, but rather is
to address, mitigate, and, if possible, eliminate the adverse impacts and
secondary effects of Sexually Oriented Business Activities on the areas in which
such Activities are located or take place and to ensure that these Activities are
established, managed, and operated in a safe and legal manner at all times.
Id.
" See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
301 See supra notes 280 through 284 and accompanying text.
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licensing employees who work at the establishments to eliminating the
ability of a dancer to obtain tips after a performance. Truly, the amount
of restriction is overbearing and excessive when viewed in light of its
purpose. Half of these restrictions taken together would adequately
prevent secondary effects without impacting the erotic message being
conveyed. However, to ensure success the County Board imposed a
numerous amount of regulations so that together, it could prevent the
activity from occurring under the guise of preventing secondary effects.
By cumulatively regulating these establishments, the county has crafted
an ordinance, that leaves little room for the erotic message to be
conveyed. This contradicts the underlying reasoning promoted by the
United States Supreme Court in Barnes.302 In Barnes, the Court's main
reason for upholding the restriction on nudity was because it deemed
this restriction "minor when measured against the dancer's remaining
capacity and opportunity to express the erotic message." 30 Clearly, the
restrictions imposed in this case are not minor and thus they would fail.
B. Proposed Statute
As an alternative to imposing individual and cumulative
restrictions on adult use establishments, this Note proposes a statute to
increase the penalty for committing a crime near an adult use
establishment. Simply put, the statute will double the criminal and civil
fines for committing offenses in and around an adult use establishment
similar to a state law which doubles the penalty for speeding in a
construction zone.3 4 The zoning would be relatively easy as many of the
adult use ordinances, including Lake County's Ordinance, have already
established these "adult use" zones.w5  Similar to school and
302 Barnes v. Glen Theatres, 501 U.S. 560,587 (1991).
3 Id.
R0 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3326 (West 1996).
§ 3326. Duty of Driver in construction and maintenance areas
(c) Fines to be doubled. - The fine for any of the following violations, when
committed in a construction or maintenance area manned by workers acting
in their official capacity, shall be double the usual amount.
(d) Notice. - Whenever practical, signs designed in compliance with
regulations of the department shall be appropriately placed to notify
motorists that increased penalties apply for moving violations in
construction or maintenance areas.
Id. (emphasis added).
1w See Lake County Zoning Ordinance, supra note 17, at 8.
1. Adult Entertainment Establishments.
a. Minimum Distance From Other Adult Entertainment Establishments. No
Adult Entertainment Establishment shall be established, maintained, or operated
on any lot that has a property line within 1,000 feet of the property line of any
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construction zones, notice of the increased penalty could be given to the
public by the use of clearly marked signs indicating entrance into such a
zone.306 By increasing the deterrence value through harsher penalties,
this statute could contribute to the elimination of harmful secondary
other lot on which any other Adult Entertainment Establishment is located,
established, maintained, or operated.
b. Minimum Distance From Protected Uses. No Adult Entertainment
Establishment shall be established, maintained, or operated on any lot that has a
property line within 1,000 feet of the property line of any other lot on which a
Protected Use is located, established, maintained, or operated.
c. Minimum Distance From Residential Property. No Adult Entertainment
Establishment shall be located, established, maintained, or operated on any lot
that has a property line within 250 feet of the property line of any Residential
Property.
Id.
-X 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-605 (Supp. 1999).
§ 11-605. Special speed limit while passing schools or while traveling through
highway construction or maintenance zones.
(a) For the purpose of this Section, "school" means the following entities:
(1) A public or private primary or secondary school.
(2) A primary or secondary school operated by a religious institution.
(3) A public, private, or religious nursery school.
On a school day when school children are present and so close thereto that a
potential hazard exists because of the close proximity of the motorized traffic, no
person shall drive a motor vehicle at a speed in excess of 20 miles per hour while
passing a school zone or while traveling upon any public thoroughfare where
children pass going to and from school.
For purposes of this Section a school day shall begin at seven ante meridian
and shall conclude at four post meridian.
This section shall not be applicable unless appropriate signs are posted
upon streets and highways under their respective jurisdiction and maintained by
the Department, township, county, park district, city, village or incorporated
town wherein the school zone is located. With regard to the special speed limit
while passing schools, such signs shall give proper due warning that a school
zone is being approached and shall indicate the school zone and the maximum
speed limit in effect during school days when school children are present
(b) No person shall operate a motor vehicle in a construction or maintenance
zone at a speed in excess of the posted speed limit when workers are
present and so close to the moving traffic that a potential hazard exists
because of the motorized traffic.
(d) For the purpose of this Section, a construction or maintenance zone is an
area in which the Department, Toll Highway Authority, or local agency has
determined that the preexisting established speed limit through a highway
construction or maintenance project is greater than is reasonable or safe
with respect to the conditions expected to exist in the construction or
maintenance zone and has posted a lower speed limit with a highway
construction or maintenance zone special speed limit sign.
(e) A violation of this Section shall be a petty offense with a minimum fine of
$150.
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effects in these designated areas while eliminating the need to suppress
the erotic message being conveyed by erotic dance. The statute would
look as follows:
Special Penalty for Committing a Criminal Act in an Adult Use Zone.
(a) For the purpose of this statue, an Adult Use Zone is defined as:
(1) A 1,000foot perimeter surrounding an Adult Use Establishment.
(2) Measurement shall be judged by a straight line, without regard to
intervening structures or objects, from the nearest point on the property line of
the lot on which the Adult Use Establishment is located.
For purposes of this Section, an Adult Use Zone shall begin at the hour of
noon and shall conclude at midnight on the normal days of operation including
Monday through Saturday.307
This section shall not be applicable unless appropriate signs are posted
upon streets and highways under their respective jurisdiction and maintained
by county, city, village, or incorporated town where the Adult Use Zone is
located. With regards to the additional penalty for committing a criminal act
while passing an adult use establishment, such signs shall give proper due
warning that an adult use zone is being approached and shall indicate the hours
of operation and penalty in effect.
(b) For purpose of this statute an Adult Use Establishment is defined as:
(1) Adult Cabaret. Any Commercial Establishment that as a substantial
or significant portion of its business features or provides any of the
following:
(a) Persons who appear Semi-Nude.
(b) Live performances that are distinguished or characterized by an
emphasis on the exposure, depiction, or description of Specified
Anatomical Areas or the conduct or simulation of Specified
Sexual Activities.
(c) Films, motion pictures, video or audio cassettes, slides, computer
displays, or other visual representations or recordings of any
kind that are distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on
the exposure, depiction, or description of Specified Anatomical
Areas, or the conduct or simulation of Specified Sexual
Activities
(2) Adult Store. Any Commercial Establishment (a) that contains one
or more Adult Booths; (b) that as a substantial or significant portion
of its business offers for sale, rental, or viewing any Adult Materials;
or (c) that has a segment or section devoted to the sale or display of
Adult Materials.
w This time frame was adopted from the Lake County Ordinance and could be altered to
coincide with local regulations. See Lake County Ordinance, supra note 13, at 17.
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(3) Adult Theater. Any Commercial Establishment that, as a substantial
or significant portion of its business, features or provides (a) films,
motion pictures, video, or audio cassettes, slides, or other visual
representations or recordings that are distinguished or characterized
by an emphasis on the exposure, depiction, or description of specified
anatomical areas, or the conduct or simulation of specified sexual
activities; or (b) live performances that are distinguished or
characterized by an emphasis on the exposure, depiction, or
description of specified anatomical areas or the conduct or
simulation of specified sexual activities.38
(c) Penalty to be doubled. The penalty for violation of any crime categorized
as sexual abuse, sexual assault, prostitution, solicitation of prostitution,
assault and battery, distribution or possession of a controlled substance,
destruction of property, or any derivation therein of the previously
mentioned crimes shall receive a fine, penalty or sentence that shall be
double of that proscribed by law when committed in an adult use zone
during the hours previously mentioned in section (a).
By using this proposed statute, the number and extent of restrictions on
adult use establishments would be reduced because arguably, the
adverse secondary effects would be reduced by the increase in the
deterrent factor, thereby allowing the erotic speech to continue relatively
unfettered.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under the guise of secondary effects and content neutral restrictions,
cumulative ordinances are infringing on the First Amendment rights of
adult use establishments. The current United States Supreme Court
precedent is inadequate due to the vagueness of the opinions and the
unclear interpretation given to it by lower courts. Individually, many of
the restrictions are valid content neutral restrictions on speech which
withstand judicial review. However, when numerous individual
ordinances are combined, the cumulative effect requires an analysis
beyond that of individual regulations. This Note has attempted to show
that under either a content based or content neutral scenario, these
cumulative ordinances would fail. Alternatively, a statute was drafted to
increase the deterrent factor around these adult use establishments so
that the erotic message conveyed within their walls could continue on
undiminished.
Clinton P. Hansen
Definition of an adult use establishment was modeled after the Lake County Ordinance
definition, see Lake County Ordinance, supra note 13, at 4-5.
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